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INTRODUCTION

In February 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in
Utah v. Strieff,' a routine Fourth Amendment dispute involving a defendant
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caught possessing a small amount of narcotics. 2 This seemingly minor case was
little anticipated, but Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissent did not go unnoticed. It
received unusual attention from the mainstream media and was described as
"ringing," 3 fiery, 4 "thundering," 5 and even as an "Atomic Bomb." 6
The media's frenzied reaction was elicited less by what was said than by
the fact that it was a Supreme Court Justice saying it. Justice Sotomayor merely
repeated a claim made many times before: she inferred that the police engage in
racial profiling. "It is no secret," she wrote, "that people of color are
disproportionate victims of this type of [police] scrutiny.
She also suggested
the Court is itself responsible for the racial inequity that seemingly pervades
America's criminal justice system because it has failed to uphold the protections
afforded under the Fourth Amendment. "When we condone officers' use of these
devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an
arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as secondclass citizens." 8
Strieffturned on a point of law most Americans have never heard of: the
Fourth Amendment's attenuation doctrine. 9 A police officer had stopped Strieff
without reasonable suspicion, and, after checking his identification, the officer
discovered an arrest warrant had been issued because of an unpaid traffic
violation.'o The officer arrested Strieff pursuant to that warrant, searched him
incident to the arrest, and then discovered illegal contraband." The question was
whether the drugs discovered during the search should be suppressed because the
officer lacked the requisite level of suspicion to make the initial stop.' 2
No one could have predicted that Strieff which involved a white male
defendant from Utah, would lead to a highly contentious dispute touching upon
racial profiling and the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson, Missouri.

2

Id. at 2060.

3
Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor's Ringing Dissent, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2 01 6/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/.
4
Tal Kopan, Sotomayor in Fiery Dissent: Illegal Stops 'Corrode All Our Civil Liberties',
CNN (June 21, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/20/politics/sotomayor-supremecourt-dissent-utah-strieff/index.html.

5

Ford, supra note 3.
Mark Joseph Stem, Read Sonia Sotomayor's Atomic Bomb of a Dissent Slamming Racial
Profiling and
Mass
Imprisonment,
SLATE
(June
20,
2016,
11:34
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2016/06/20/sonia-sotomayor-dissent-in-utah-v-strieff t
6

akesonpolice-misconduct.html.
Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8

Id. at 2069.

9
I

Id. at 2058.
See id. at 2059-60 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2060.

12

See id.

10
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However, Justice Sotomayor offered a scathing and uniquely personal critique
of America's criminal justice system:
For generations, black and brown parents have given their
children "the talk"-instructing them never to run down the
street; always keep your hands where they can be seen ... all
out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them ...
[T]his case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent,
that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says
that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the
violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a
democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be
cataloged.' 3
In addition to her racial profiling accusation, Justice Sotomayor also
warned that condoning the officer's behavior in Strieffcould open the door to the
type of police practices one would expect to find in an authoritarian police state.14
She predicted police would soon be making suspicionless stops of "joggers, dog
walkers, and lemonade vendors." 15 Dissenting Justices often make hyperbolic
assertions. However, less than three weeks after Strieffwas decided, the shooting
of Philando Castile seemingly substantiated Justice Sotomayor's argument.
Castile's death received nationwide publicity because his fianc6 began live
streaming the incident immediately after he was shot.' 6 Viewers could see
horrific images of Castile's bloody torso slumped over in the driver's seat.' 7
The shooting was a tragedy, but we should not assume that the Mexican
American officer who shot Castile was motivated by racial animus or that he
intentionally meant harm. It appears the shooting was a terrible mistake.' 8 But,
after giving this individual police officer the benefit of the doubt, we can still ask
why so many other officers repeatedly stopped Castile for trivial traffic
violations. The former cafeteria worker, paid less than $20 an hour, had been
pulled over at least 49 times in 13 yearsl 9 and was charged with 79 different

13

Id. at 2070--71.

See id.
See id. at 2067.
'6
Mitch Smith, Family of Minnesota Man Killed by Police Calls for Inquiry by a Special
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2016, at A10.
17
Id.
18
The officer was eventually acquitted of all charges related to the incident. See Mitch Smith,
Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html?mcubz=0.
19
Sharon La Franiere & Mitch Smith, PhilandoCastile Was PulledOver 49 Times in 13 Years,
Often
for
Minor
Infractions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/before-philando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trailof-minor-traffic-stops.html. There are conflicting reports regarding the number of times Castile
14

1s

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6

472

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120

minor traffic violations 48 of which were eventually dismissed. 20 Those who
have escaped such experiences can only imagine how frustrating this must have
been. The more than $6,000 he accumulated in traffic violations would have cost
Castile more than 300 hours of his pre-tax salary. 2 1 It is unclear how many days
he spent in traffic court, but we do know his car was repeatedly impounded.22
After his death, his mother recalled telling him, "Every time you get in that car
and leave out the door you come back with another ticket ....
If Castile had been stopped for offenses such as speeding or reckless
driving, we could conclude the police were only doing their job. However,
according to an analysis conducted by NPR, only six of the stops were for "things
a police officer would notice from outside a car-things like speeding or having
a broken muffler." 2 4 Instead, most of Castile's offenses were for matters that
would not have been discovered until after the stop, such as not having proof of
insurance. 2 5 Perhaps the police were running his license plate on a computerized
system before stopping him and seeing the car had been cited for previous
violations. However, one would then have to ask why so many officers had
chosen to run one particular motorist's license plate out of all the vehicles on the
highway. Moreover, no one even knows how many times Castile was stopped
and given only a verbal warning.
There is good reason to believe Castile was targeted because the officers
thought a young black man with dreadlocks was likely engaged in graver crimes
than a turn signal violation. It was exactly these kinds of unwarranted stops
during which an officer hopes "to fish further for evidence of wrongdoing" that
Justice Sotomayor warned against in Strieff 26 The only difference is that the
defendant in Strieffwas a pedestrian, not a motorist. 27 And, as we shall see, prior
to Strieff the Court had already condoned random investigatory "encounters"

was stopped. The New York Times reported 49 times. See id. But the New York Times has also
reported 52 times. See Mitch Smith, Philando Castile's Last Night: Tacos and Laughs, Then a
Drive, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/us/philando-castileminnesota-police-shooting.html.
20
A.J. Lagoe & Steven Eckert, KARE 11 Investigates: RacialProfilingin Minnesota, KAREI 1
(July 7, 2016, 10:53 PM), http://www.karell.com/news/investigations/kare-1 1-investigatesracial-profiling-in-minnesota/266814958.
21
Eyder Peralta, The Driving Life and Death of Philando Castile, NPR (July 15, 2016, 4:51
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/15/485835272/the-driving-life-anddeath-of-philando-castile.
22
See LaFraniere,supra note 19.
23

Id.

24

Peralta, supra note 21.

25

Id.

26

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

27

Id. at 2060.
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targeting domestic airline passengers28 and bus passengers. 29 It then permitted
pretext stops of motorists. 30 In Strieff Sotomayor was hoping to draw the line
with pedestrians. 3 1
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, disputed Justice
Sotomayor's assertions. He insisted that what had happened in Strieff "was not a
suspicionless fishing expedition 'in the hope that something would turn up,"' 32
and he blithely dismissed Justice Sotomayor's warning that failure to suppress
the evidence would encourage the police to conduct large-scale stops of
pedestrians in the future: "Strieff argues that, because of the prevalence of
outstanding arrest warrants in many jurisdictions, police will engage in dragnet
searches if the exclusionary rule is not applied. We think that this outcome is
unlikely. Such wanton conduct would expose police to civil liability." 3 3
The Court's debate in Strieff reflects a larger division in American
society over the issue of racial profiling and proactive policing. An
overwhelming majority of African Americans have long claimed racial profiling
is widespread, but only a bare majority of white Americans agree. 34 Moreover,
in a poll released last year, half of white Americans told researchers that
discrimination against whites has become as big a problem today as
discrimination against blacks and other minorities.35
This Article challenges the skeptics of racial profiling, including the five
Justices who signed an opinion declaring dragnet policing is not a threat in the
United States, by tracing the 40-year history of something far worse: racially
targeted dragnet policing. It contains the most comprehensive history of racial
profiling yet published and proves the existence of systemic and institutionalized
selective enforcement practices by chronicling how they have progressed in a
series of four stages which have corresponded with different modes of
transportation. The first three stages grew out of the "War on Drugs," and the

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980).
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (stating that the Court had previously ruled the
Fourth Amendment "permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies"
and holding that "the same rule applies to police encounters that take place on a bus").
30
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996).
31
Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 2064 (majority opinion) (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U. S. 687, 691 (1982)).
28
29

33

Id.

According to Gallup News, the percentage of white Americans who believe racial profiling
is widespread declined from 56% in 1999 to 54% in 2003. Jack Ludwig, Americans See Racial
34

Profiling

Widespread,

GALLUP

NEWS

(May

13,

2003),

http://www.gallup.com/poll/8389/Americans-See-Racial-ProfilingWidespread.aspx?gsource=racial%20profiling&gmedium=search &geampaign=tiles.
35

See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL, ANXIETY, NOSTALGIA, AND MISTRUST: FINDINGS FROM THE 2015

AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY

5 (2015), http://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-

AVS-2015-Web.pdf.
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primary goal was drug interdiction. 36 Racially targeted dragnet policing began in
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport in 1974, and it quickly spread to airports
nationwide.37 By the early 1980s, black and Latino passengers using long
distance buses and trains were targeted; minority motorists came next. Finally,
beginning in the mid-1990s, the primary aim became gun control, and the police
began focusing primarily on pedestrians of color.
In recounting this history, this Article cites previously ignored sources
to prove how law enforcement has purposefully designed and implemented racial
profiling strategies. Prior scholars have relied on the testimonial accounts of
victims, 3 8 case law,39 statistical evidence, 4 0 laws and consent decrees, 4 1 political
speeches, 42 and policy makers' statements and decision-making.4 3 However,
there is a critical voice nussmg in these accounts: the voice of the police. This
Article draws upon a police training manual, memoirs written by the most
respected law enforcement leaders in the country, and sworn testimony by lower
level officers to prove that racial profiling policies and dragnet policing strategies
have been purposefully designed and implemented for over 40 years.
These law enforcement sources provide a unique perspective from which
to examine Supreme Court decisions which condoned the various stages of racial
profiling. For example, the Court has ruled that "the Fourth Amendment permits
police officers to approach individuals at random ... to ask them questions and
to request consent to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate."" Yet, according to a
"classic[]" 45 police manual, Tacticsfor CriminalPatrol("Tactics"), "the reasons
for giving consent are not affected by logic," 4 6 and "[p]sychologically ... the

36

See discussion infra Part Ill.

3

See discussion infra Section III.A.

38

See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND

CITIZENSHIP (2014).
3

See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).

4
William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, ChallengingRacial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow
on the Interstate, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 83 (2001).
41
For an excellent summary of various consent decrees, see Brandon Garrett, Remedying
Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001).
42

See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON DRUGS TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE

MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016).
43

MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT [N AMERICA (1995).

4

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).

45

Preliminary Expert Witness Report of Robert C. Willis at 6, J.G. v. Lingle, No. 13-cv-414-

sic, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120058 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 28, 2014) (stating that Tactics is considered
a classic in the field).
46

CHARLES REMSBERG, TACTICS FOR CRIMINAL PATROL: VEHICLE STOPS,
DRUG DISCOVERY,
AND OFFICER SURVIVAL 211 (1995).
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chances are overwhelming that the average person won't leave" when asked to
do something by a police officer.47
This Article also illustrates how this "reasonable person" standard has
eviscerated Fourth Amendment protections. Unlike other constitutional rights,
the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is today limited to
"reasonable" people who are capable of distinguishing between an officer's
request and a politely worded order. However, as lower courts have warned, "a
reasonable person might [incorrectly] read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous
expression of a demand backed by force of law." 4 8 No other constitutional right
is so restricted. For example, the First Amendment protects our right to assert the
most ridiculous arguments, associate with the most illogical people, and pray to
the silliest of deities.49 Under the Court's "reasonable person" approach however,
the onus of upholding the Fourth Amendment becomes the responsibility of
citizens who are confronted by the power of the state.
This Article proceeds along the following lines. Part II examines the
underlying facts of Strieff it defines the terms "racial profiling" and "dragnet
policing," and it explains how today's racial profiling differs from Jim Crow era
police practices. Part III chronicles the first three stages of racially targeted
dragnet policing. It illustrates how the fiction of "consent" based stops and
searches has been used to bypass the protections guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment. It also illustrates how the police have been trained to practice
racially targeted dragnet policing while concealing it from judges. Part IV
explores the fourth stage of racially targeted dragnet policing, the "stop-andfrisk" of pedestrians which was pioneered in New York City during the mid1990s. It demonstrates that Justice Sotomayor's warning of how the police might
start making suspicionless stops of "joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade
vendors" was no exaggeration.50 In fact, this has already come to pass. Joggers,
unlicensed food vendors, and even children riding their bicycles on the sidewalk,
if they were black or Latino, were regularly targeted by the police during the
apex of New York City's stop-and-frisk program. Lastly, Part V of this Article
makes concluding points by reiterating how the Court's holding in Strieff
condones a racially targeted dragnet policing program.

Id. at 215.
Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
49
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (holding that Westboro Baptist Church's
protest displaying signs saying "God Hates Fags," "Fags Doom Nations," and "Thank God for
Dead Soldiers" near a private family's funeral for their son killed in combat, is protected speech
under the First Amendment); Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 823-24 (D. Neb. 2016)
(noting plaintiff's arguments based in his belief of the "divine 'Flying Spaghetti Monster').
So
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
47
48
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II. DRAGNET POLICING AND RACIAL PROFILING
A.

Strieff and the Threat ofDragnetPolicing

Strieff began with an anonymous tip that "narcotics activity" was
occurring at a residence in South Salt Lake City, Utah.5 ' Detective Douglas
Fackrell subsequently conducted intermittent surveillance of the home for about
a week.52 Since he saw a number of visitors leaving just a few minutes after
entering the house, he became suspicious that the occupants were dealing
drugs. Fackrell returned to the residence and observed the defendant, Edward
Strieff, exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store.54 Fackrell
followed him and then "ordered Strieff to stop in the parking lot." 55 Fackrell
asked for identification, relayed Strieff s information to a police dispatcher, and
learned that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. 5 6
Fackrell then arrested Strieff pursuant to that warrant, searched Strieff incident
to the arrest, and discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 5
Although the officer had witnessed Strieff coming out of the residence,
he had not seen Strieff going in.58 The prosecution conceded that Fackrell lacked
reasonable suspicion when he made the stop because he did not know if the
defendant fell into the category of suspicious short-term visitors. 59 When Strieff
moved for the judge to suppress the evidence found against him, the state
answered that the evidence should be deemed admissible because it fell under
the doctrine of attenuation, one of the three exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 6 0
The Court's main weapon in upholding the Fourth Amendment is the
exclusionary rule, which suppresses the evidence of an illegal search. 6 1 Not all
illegal searches result in the application of the exclusionary rule. One such
exception is the doctrine of attenuation. Under this doctrine, evidence discovered

5'

Id. at 2059.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 2060.

5

State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015).
Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2060.

56
5
58

Id.
Id. at 2063 ("[H]e had not observed what time Strieff entered the suspected drug house, so

he did not know how long Strieff had been there.").
59
During oral argument, the Utah Solicitor General said, "We've admitted that this was a
miscalculation, but it was a close call." Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.

Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373).
See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702, 708 (Or. 2014) ("There are three recognized
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule: (1) the inevitable discovery exception; (2)
the independent source exception; and (3) the attenuation exception.").
61
Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
60
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through police misconduct is admissible if the link between an officer's
misconduct and the discovered evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."62
For example, imagine after Strieff had been stopped, arrested, and
discovered to have been carrying illegal drugs, he was read his Miranda rights,
consulted with his attorney, was released on bail, and then a week later
voluntarily returned to the police station with his lawyer and confessed to the
crime of illegal drug possession. Perhaps the drugs should be excluded from
evidence because the stop had been unconstitutional; that question certainly
divided the Justices in Strieff However, since the whole point of the exclusionary
rule is to deter police misconduct, there would appear to be little gained by
excluding the voluntary confession from being used as evidence against the
defendant. Thus, the question is not simply whether the evidence would have
come to light "but for" the illegal actions of the police. "Rather, the more apt
question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint."' 63
The Court uses a three-pronged test to determine whether evidence
discovered after a Fourth Amendment violation should be deemed admissible
under the doctrine of attenuation.64 The first factor is temporal proximity. 6 5 In
our hypothetical scenario, the confession was not made until a week after the
illegal stop, thus weakening the link. However, the evidence in Strieff was
discovered almost immediately after the officer stopped Strieff, so there was little
debate that this factor favored suppressing the evidence. 66
There was more disagreement regarding the second factor: the presence
of intervening circumstances. 67 Did the discovery of the arrest warrant attenuate
the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence that was seized
incident to the warrant arrest? Before Strieff the Court had discussed intervening
circumstances in reference to "an intervening independent act of a free will," and
in a previous case, the suspect had, in fact, returned to the police station after his
release to confess.6 8 Another example would be if, during the stop, a passerby
alerted Officer Fackrell that Strieff had assaulted her the previous day.
In these scenarios, unlike in Strieff the doctrine of attenuation is being
triggered by an action committed by someone other than the arresting officer.

62
63
6

Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (citation omitted).
Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)).

65

Id. at 2062.

66

Id

67

Id.

68

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
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According to the majority, the doctrine of attenuation was nonetheless applicable
in Strieff because "the warrant was valid, it predated Officer Fackrell's
investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the stop." 69 According to
Justice Sotomayor, however, the warrant check did not constitute an intervening
event because the "sole purpose" of the stop was "to fish for evidence,"7 o and a
warrant check of a pedestrian "is a measure aimed at 'detect[ing] evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 7'
The Court's typical legal debate turned into a much broader examination
of the criminal justice system when the Court reached the third prong of the
attenuation test: "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." 7 The
majority argued Fackrell "was at most negligent" and that what had occurred was
an "isolated" incident as opposed to "systemic or recurrent police misconduct." 7 3
Justice Sotomayor answered that there had been no reason to run a warrant check,
and she feared that condoning the stop would motivate the police to start
routinely running warrant checks on pedestrians, as they already do on
motorists.74

The Court's rationale for allowing routine warrant checks of motorists is
that "the legitimacy of a person's driver's license has a 'close connection to
roadway safety."' 75 However, according to Justice Sotomayor, Fackrell had not
run the warrant check on Strieff because of safety concerns. He had done so
specifically to discover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing and, as noted,
she feared that if the Court were to condone the practice, police officers would
soon start running random warrant-checks of "joggers, dog walkers, and
lemonade vendors." 76 It was this argument to which Thomas was responding
when he wrote that "dragnet searches" are an "unlikely" possibility because
"[s]uch wanton conduct would expose police to civil liability."7 7
B. Defining "DragnetPolicing"and "RacialProfiling"
Although "dragnet policing" was central to the debate in Strieff the term
was never defined. According to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, the
term has two meanings, the first of which is "a net drawn along the bottom of a

69

70

7
72

Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
Id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Id. (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41 (2000)).
Id. at 2058 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975)).

7

Id. at 2058, 2063.
74
Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
7
Id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609,
1615 (2015)).
76

Id.

n

Id. at 2064 (majority opinion).
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body of water" or "a net used on the ground (as to capture small game); the
second definition is "a network of measures for apprehension (as of
criminals)."7 In addition to these two definitions, there is a third possible
meaning, one borrowed from the famous Dragnet radio and television series.
Rather than running a dragnet to catch multiple criminals, the police might
employ large-scale coordinated measures to apprehend a particularly dangerous
individual. 7 9 However, such measures were not at issue. The use of the term
"dragnet" in Strieff was closer to its original meaning: a net used for fishing that
randomly sweeps up all in its path, the guilty as well as the innocent.
Dragnet policing may be understood by comparing wild game hunting
with dragnet fishing. If a hunter stalks wild game, she will use a rifle's cross hairs
to kill a targeted animal. When fishermen use a dragnet, they presumably target
areas where they expect the best haul to be, but the net randomly captures
everything in its path that is not too small to escape through the netting.
Traditional policing is reactive and similar to wild game hunting; the
police receive a crime report and then search for the perpetrator. Dragnet
policing, on the other hand, is proactive; the police target neighborhoods and
groups in which crime is thought to be clustered. Jack Maple, a legendary figure
behind the development of the New York Police Department's Compstat
program, often said that it is unusual to catch a criminal in the act of committing
a crime. Therefore, the police must seek "to catch crooks when the crooks are
off-duty." 0 To do so, the police "must be sent where the maps show
concentrations of crime or criminals," and they must vigorously enforce
"relatively minor violations" once they get there. 8
Neither dragnet policing nor racial profiling relies on individualized
suspicion as is generally demanded by the Fourth Amendment. The police
neither seek to catch a particular suspect who committed a specific crime nor
stop individuals based on suspicious behavior. Dragnet policing is closely
associated with racial profiling, but there are distinctions. If the police stop and
search every person at a roadblock to check for narcotics, this would constitute
a dragnet search. If the police stop a motorist not because of his driving, but
because he is a young black man with dreadlocks, that would be an example of
racial profiling. If New York City police officers systematically stop large
numbers of black and Latino young men at random because they live where "the
maps show concentrations of crime," 8 2 this would constitute both racial profiling
and dragnet policing, or racially targeted dragnet policing.

7

Dragnet,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE

DICTIONARY,

http:www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/dragnet.
79
Dragnet (NBC television broadcast 1951-1959, 1967-1970).
80

JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: How YOU CAN MAKE YOUR

COMMUNITY CRIME FREE 155 (1999).
81
Id. at 155-57.
82

MAPLE, supra note 80, at 155.
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Although dragnet policing is generally impermissible, when it is race
neutral, it is not necessarily unconstitutional or even controversial. For example,
consider domestic passenger screening at airport security gates or sobriety
checkpoints. 8 3 There is no individualized suspicion, but all are subjected to
questioning, identification checks, and searches. Other than terrorists and
alcoholics, most Americans appear to support these measures.
Although society generally accepts such race neutral dragnet policing
measures, they nonetheless constitute exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of individualized suspicion to affect a stop and/or search. Dragnet
policing obviously becomes even more constitutionally suspect when it is used
to target individuals based on their race, age, and/or gender because such policing
measures also raise Equal Protection considerations.
It is sometimes argued that racial profiling has been practiced since the
Jim Crow era. 84 However, the type of institutionalized racial profiling, which
began roughly 40 years ago, is markedly different than what preceded it. What
happened to Philando Castile is qualitatively different than what occurred in the
infamous 1932 Scottsboro Case. The distinction between the two incidents is
made clear when one considers the federal government's definition of racial
profiling:
The term "racial profiling" means the practice of a law
enforcement agent or agency relying, to any degree, on race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion in selecting which
individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory
activities or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law
enforcement activity following the initial investigatory
procedure, except when there is trustworthy information,
relevant to the locality and timeframe, that links a person of a
particular race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion to an
identified criminal incident or scheme.85
Under this definition, if a rape victim identifies her assailant as a
Caucasian, it is perfectly acceptable for law enforcement agents to ignore all

83

The Court sanctioned sobriety checkpoints in Michigan DepartmentofState Police v. Sitz.

496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). The Court has also permitted random drug testing of railroad personnel
involved in train accidents, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989); random
drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms or are involved in drug interdiction, Nat'1

Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79 (1989); and drug testing for all students
who participated in extracurricular activities, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002).
84

It is often claimed that "racial profiling is not a new experience. Racial profiling continues

the historical goals of the black codes by having a chilling effect on a black person's freedom of
movement." L. Darnell Weeden, Johnnie Cochran Challenged America's New Age Officially
Unintentional Black Code; A Constitutionally Permissible Racial Profiling Policy, 33 T.
MARSHALL L. REv. 135, 137 (2007).
85
End Racial Profiling Act of2013, S. 1038, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
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black, Latino and Asian men in their investigation. What is not permitted would
be to selectively target a racial group in "routine or spontaneous investigatory
activities" without "trustworthy information" which can link the suspect to an
"identified criminal incident or scheme." 8 6 The Scottsboro Case began with a
crime report. Two women claimed they had been raped by a group of black males
on a train.

Philando Castile, on the other hand, was not stopped 52 times based on
police reports; he was undoubtedly stopped because of factors completely
unrelated to individualized suspicion: his race, age, gender, and hair style." The
fact that he was stopped so many times was not an aberration; numerous studies
have shown that the police have been systematically targeting minority motorists
for decades. 89

Although the Scottsboro Case defendants were not victims of racial
profiling as we understand that term today, it is true that racially targeted dragnet
policing did occur on an ad hoc basis prior to the 1970s. The Japanese internment
during World War II is the most obvious example. And, as Terry v. Ohio90
reveals, racially targeted dragnet policing became a concern in northern inner
cities after World War 11.91 In fact, Chief Justice Earl Warren's Terry opinion

86
87

88

Id.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,49 (1932).
Smith, supra note 16.

89
The racial disparity in traffic stops and arrests in Ferguson, Missouri, recently received
widespread media attention because of the shooting of Michael Brown. See, e.g., Matt
Apuzzo, Ferguson Police Routinely Violate Rights of Blacks, Justice Dept. Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/justice-department-finds-pattern-ofpolice-bias-and-excessive-force-in-ferguson.html. The Justice Department also issued a report
confirming these allegations. DOJ, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE

DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015). A recent comprehensive study showing a marked disparity in traffic
stops compiled data from four states: Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. See
Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The DisproportionateRisks of Driving While Black
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-trafficstops-driving-black.html. Older studies include the OrlandoSentinel Pulitzer Prize winning series
of articles exposing the practices of Sherriff Robert Vogel's officers. See Jeff Brazil & Steve
Berry, Series: Tainted Cash or Easy Money?

ORLANDO

SENTINEL,

(June

14,

1992),

http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-06-14/news/9206131060_1_seizures-kea-drug-squad.
The law review literature is also vast. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
MiAMI L. REv. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544,
546-47 (1997); Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian
Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth

Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998); and David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority
Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (1997).
90
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
91
Id. at 14 n. 11 (stating that "in many communities, field interrogations are a major source of
friction between the police and minority groups." (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967))).
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even addressed how the exclusionary rule is sometimes incapable of preventing
illegal searches and seizures.
Warren explained the exclusionary rule is "powerless to deter invasions
of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal." 92 Considering how Justice Thomas denied even the
possibility of dragnet policing in Strieff it is rather ironic that the seminal Terry
decision uses examples of dragnet policing to illustrate the limitations of
exclusionary rule. Warren discussed how the police sometimes conduct "a
dragnet search of all teenagers in a particular section of the city for weapons
because they have heard rumors of an impending gang fight." 93 Warren's
example also illustrates how, under some circumstances, even racially targeted
dragnet policing may be morally justified, if not legally permissible.
This Author has been told by older neighbors living in Park Slope,
Brooklyn, that ethnic gangs once staged knife fights in Prospect Park at night. If
50 years ago unsubstantiated rumors swirled that an Italian gang and a Puerto
Rican gang were planning such a battle, should it have been constitutionally
impermissible for the police to try and prevent bloodshed by running a "dragnet
search" that focused on young men who looked Italian or Puerto Rican? Terry
demonstrates that the Supreme Court was once willing to acknowledge the
existence of such practices and the difficult moral and legal questions which
sometimes arise. Recently, controversial police shootings, violent protests, and
now ambush attacks on police officers have once again made policing a
discussion of national importance. Yet, until Strieff the Court had remained
silent on the subject of racial profiling for decades. 94
This paper does not condemn non-racially targeted dragnet policing. The
threat of terrorism and the prevalence of handguns perhaps demand we reassess
the constitutional requirement of individualized suspicion to conduct stops and
searches. Jeffrey Bellin has argued that there is an "inverse relationship" between
the effectiveness of the New York City stop-and-frisk program and its
constitutionality, 9 5 while Bernard Harcourt and Tracey Meares have even
advocated eliminating the "individualized suspicion" requirement in favor of
greater randomization of stops, a viewpoint this Author largely supports. 9 6

Id. at 14.
Id. at 13 n.9 (emphasis added).
94
A Lexis search reveals the term "racial profiling" has appeared in only three Supreme Court
cases and all in passing: Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 739 (2011); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001); and Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 nn. 9 & 10 (2000).
95
Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionalityand Effectiveness of
New York City "Stop and Frisk", 94 B.U. L. REv. 1495, 1500-20 (2014) (chronicling the evolution
of New York City's stop-and-frisk policy).
96
Bernard Harcourt & Tracey Meares, Randomization and the FourthAmendment, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 809, 811 (2011).
92

9
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Racially targeted dragnet policing is troubling less because it is random than
because it targets people by skin color. Subjecting all Americans to random
searches is considerably easier to accept than the idea that the police will only
subject particular races to such measures. These issues, however, have not been
addressed by the Court because the majority presently denies the possibility of
dragnet policing and, until Strieff it had largely avoided even mentioning the
term "racial profiling." 97
II. THE RISE AND SPREAD OF RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA
The next two Sections of this Article demonstrate that racially targeted
dragnet policing has existed for more than 40 years. During this period, lower
courts overwhelmingly declared such practices to be unconstitutional, but they
were repeatedly overruled by the Supreme Court. This battle between lower
courts and the Supreme Court is one of the untold chapters in the history of racial
profiling.
A.

Stage One ofRacial Profilingin America: The Airport Drug Courier
Profile

Modem day racially targeted dragnet policing began in 1974 after the
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), assigned a single agent, Paul Markonni, to
interdict drugs at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. From today's perspective,
security measures at airports used to be shockingly lax. Metal detectors were not
installed in airports nationwide until January 5, 1973.98 Until then, it was possible
to enter an airport and proceed to one's boarding gate without encountering an
X-ray machine, a metal detector, or even a uniformed security guard. 99
Identification was not required, and some flights even permitted passengers to
pay their fares after take-off as commuter trains do today. 100 Family members or
friends could accompany a passenger to the boarding gate and wave goodbye.'oI
It is unclear how the DEA expected Markonni to distinguish drug
couriers from other passengers as they passed through the terminal. Markonni
himself later admitted that "when we started this detail at the airport, we didn't
really know what we were looking for."' 0 2 However, Markonni eventually
compiled what he called a "number of deviant characteristics" to identify

9
98

See supra note 94.
BRENDAN I. KOERNER, THE SKIES BELONG TO Us 216 (2014).

100

Id. at 7-8.
Id.

01

Id.

9

102

United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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potential drug couriers. 103 Prosecutors began referring to the list as a "profile,"
and Markonni eventually became credited with having created the world's first
drug courier profile.1 04
Based on trial testimony, it is obvious that Markonni and other agents
considered skin color to be the most reliable indicator of "deviance." In fact, it
appears that any minority travelling from or to any major city was automatically
considered to be "suspicious." For example, Markonni once testified that most
drug couriers were in his opinion black women;105 in a second case, according to
the judge, Markonni "implied" that "the confluence of . .. two factors[,]
defendant's arrival from Los Angeles and his race [(African American)] is to be
considered as particularly significant." 10 6 Another agent testified that the
"suspicious traits" he looked for were "people travelling from a source
city . . . [and] people who are Hispanics (especially Mexicans);"' 0 7 when asked
whether the fact that a passenger is of Hispanic descent arouses his suspicion, an
agent testified that "it is something we take cognizance of;"'0o and, in 1990,
Agent Carl B. Hicks testified that he had been on the lookout for "sharply dressed
black female couriers," 09 but two years later, the same agent testified that a
disembarking passenger caught his attention because he was "a roughly dressed
young black male.""1 0
Some judges noted, without protest, that a criterion of the profile
includes "appearing to be a person of Hispanic background,""' while others
expressed their "uncomfortable impression . .. that, but for the Hispanic
appearance of [the defendants], they might not have been stopped." 1 2 Perhaps
the best evidence that the DEA had begun a form of dragnet policing targeting
minority airline passengers is found in the testimony of Memphis agents who
said that 75% of the individuals followed were black at a time when only 4% of

United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
See United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (5th Cir.
1982) (identifying Markonni as the composer of the profile); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d
1075, 1079 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Elmore 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.
103

104

1979) (citing Markonni's testimony listing the characteristics of the profile).
05
McClain, 452 F. Supp. at 199 (Markonni stating on direct examination that "[i]n the majority

of cases the courier has been a black female").
106
United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433, 439 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
107
United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 692-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
108
United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1353 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
109
United States v. Condelee, 915 F.2d 1206, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990).
110
United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992).
M
112

United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981).
Vasquez, 612 F.2d at 1352-53 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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the airline travelers were black, according to the Federal Transportation
Association. "3
If the agents had any empirical basis to substantiate their assumption that
blacks and Latinos were more likely to be drug couriers than were white
passengers, they failed to offer that evidence in any of the cases quoted above or
anywhere else as far as this Author can determine. Although race has long been
equated with criminality in the United States, the DEA's airport "drug courier
profile" program was unprecedented because Markonni's profile, with its racial
criteria, became incorporated into a federal agency's training program.1 14
Since the airport "drug courier profile" was implemented at a time when
many cases still went to trial, it is possible to trace the development and spread
of this initial stage of racially targeted dragnet policing through case law. It is
evident that the DEA did not one day abandon traditional police work in favor
of randomly targeting black and Latino passengers; racial profiling became a
prevalent practice in airports more by accident than by design. As Markonni once
testified, "[t]he majority of our cases, when we first started, involved cases we
made based on information from law enforcement agencies or from airline
personnel." 115 Moreover, it appears that the agents were initially using the
"profile" as a supplement, as opposed to a substitute, for traditional police work.
United States v. Van Lewis" 6 was the first published case examining
Markonni's airport "drug courier profile."'"7 Van Lewis was a consolidated case
involving three sets of defendants." 8 The first two, Van Lewis and Hughes, had
been traveling individually.11 9 The third set, which we will collectively refer to
as McCaleb, comprised three companions traveling together. A ticket agent had
alerted Markonni about the named defendant, Van Lewis, after he triggered the
profile's criteria. 120 Van Lewis had used cash to purchase a short-term round-trip
ticket to Los Angeles.121 While Van Lewis was flying to Los Angeles, Markonni
was investigating the address that Van Lewis had provided.1 2 2 Markonni

113
United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1409 (6th Cir. 1990) (overturned on other grounds);
Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: The Law's Victims in the War on Drugs,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al (reprinted from PIrSBURGH PRESs, Aug. 11, 1991),
http://www.fear.org/guilty2.html#1.
114
United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Mich. 1976). ("Little testimony was
presented concerning the source and content of the profile other than Agent Back's assertion that
it is a composite given to him by his superiors.").
1'
United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
116
409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
117
Id. at 535.
118
See id.

at 5 37.

11

Id.

120

Id. at 539.

121

Id.
Id. at 539-40.

122
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discovered that Van Lewis's apartment was already under local police
surveillance and that the suspect had been previously arrested for heroin
possession. 123 By the time Van Lewis returned to Detroit, Markonni was waiting
for him.
Unlike Van Lewis, the third set of defendants was stopped solely on the
basis of the profile1 24 (the second defendant was stopped on the basis of mistaken
identity).1 25 The "suspicious behavior" ascribed to the McCaleb party was typical
of later cases. An agent testified McCaleb had been stopped because a member
of the party "either made a local telephone call or went to the restroom on the
way to the baggage claim area [and that] [t]he group walked together through the
concourse but did not converse as normal people do when they depart a plane."' 2 6
The trial judge held the "profile" provided a "founded suspicion" to detain
McCaleb, and that he had "consented" to the search of his luggage.1 2 7 However,
consider how this "request" was phrased. The agent told McCaleb that "he would
like permission to search the suitcase but that if he refused he would proceed
immediately to the magistrate's office and attempt to obtain a search warrant."' 28
The judge ruled McCaleb had "consented" to the search because he had unlocked
the suitcase for the agent and silently stepped back.1 29 But did McCaleb have any
choice? The agents had also "requested" to search the luggage of the second
defendant, Hughes.1 30 When Hughes declined, "[s]he was placed under arrest
and the bag was opened, searched, and heroin was found."' 3 1 These requests
bring to mind the famous line in the Godfather, "I'll make him an offer he can't
refuse." 32
McCaleb's appeal of his conviction marked the first time a federal
appellate court heard a case involving the airport "drug courier profile."' 3 3
McCaleb was asking the appellate court to overturn a factual determination.1 3 4
During the suppression hearing, Judge Joiner had been asked to decide whether
McCaleb had consented to be searched. 13 As the Sixth Circuit explained, "the

123
124

125
126

Id.
Id. at 541.
The agents confused the suspect with her sister. Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.

127

Id. at 544.
Id. at 541.
129
Id. at 545 ("McCaleb obtained the key to the bag from Page, unlocked the suitcase, and
stepped back for the agent to open the case.").
130
Id. at 540.
128

13'

Id.

132

THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).

'3
134

United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719 (6th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 720.

135

Id.
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question of voluntariness of a consent is 'a question of fact' . . and as such
requires this court to hold the district judge's finding of voluntary consent to be
clearly erroneous before it can be overruled." 3 6 Despite the exceedingly high
burden of proof, the Sixth Circuit still overruled Joiner's holding that conformity
to the drug "'courier profile' gave rise to a 'founded suspicion"' which permitted
the limited interrogation.1 3 7 And it reversed the lower court's holding that
McCaleb had consented to the search. 3 8 Judge Joiner was not just wrong, he was
clearly erroneous.
McCaleb set a very important precedent. The Sixth Circuit eventually
heard over a dozen "drug courier profile" cases, and it consistently held that mere
conformity to the "rather loosely formulated list of characteristics used by the
Detroit . .. agents" did not "indicate 'suspicious' persons."' 3 9 Three other circuit
courts looked at pure "drug courier profile" cases before the Supreme Court's
first airport "drug courier profile" decision, UnitedStates v. Mendenhall.14 0 The
Second and Fifth Circuits agreed with the Sixth Circuit that mere conformity to
the profile criteria was insufficient to form the basis for an investigative stop, let
alone probable cause to effect a search. 141 The Ninth Circuit ruled it would not
decide whether conformity to the profile alone would constitute reasonable
suspicion for a stop because it held that the search was the "critical issue." 42 it
held that the defendant's "conformity to some of the drug courier profile factors
and his nervous behavior when stopped were insufficient to 'warrant a prudent

136

Id. at 720-21 (emphasis added).

137
138

Id. at 720.
Id. at 721 ("This court concludes that such consent as was here involved was not shown by
the government to have been 'freely and voluntarily' given and that therefore, the conclusion of
the district court to the contrary was clearly erroneous.").
139
Id. at 719. For examples of subsequent cases in which the Sixth Circuit relied on McCaleb
to declare the "drug courier profile" could not form the basis of probable cause, see United States

v. Daniels, 588 F.2d 831, 831 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Upon consideration of the briefs and oral arguments
of counsel together with the record and transcript the court concludes that this case is

indistinguishable from United States v. McCaleb."); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 667 (6th
Cir. 1977) ("As we stated in United States v. McCaleb. . . , satisfaction of a drug courier profile,

in itself, does not establish probable cause."); and United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 201
(E.D. Mich. 1977) ("The decision of the Court of Appeals in United States v. McCaleb . . requires
that the evidence obtained by the government from the search of McClain's baggage on November

25, 1975, be suppressed at trial since the stop and detention of McClain were illegal.").
140
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
141

United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.

Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1340
(2d Cir. 1979), where the Second Circuit arguably upheld a stop and search involving nothing more
than mere conformity to the "drug courier profile" criteria.
142
United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1980).
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(person) 1in43 believing that petitioner had committed or was committig an
offense."'
In addition to these four appellate courts, the Eighth Circuit, in a case
involving an informant's tip, dismissed the profile's criteria as having "little or
no probative value."14 Although circuit courts upheld searches where DEA
agents used independent police work to gather more evidence, or when additional
factors such as x-ray machine discoveries were made, these five circuit courts
unanimously agreed that mere conformity to the profile could not constitute
probable cause to effect a search.1 4 5 And the three circuit courts that ruled on the
issue of whether the police were justified in making the stop all agreed that the
profile alone could not be used to establish even reasonable suspicion.
Although several trial judges upheld stops based solely on the "profile,"
federal appellate courts unanimously rejected this new approach to policing.
These appellate courts did not simply reject the "profile," they treated it with
disdain. Consider, for example, how the Sixth Circuit characterized the profile
in United States v. Andrews 146:
This is yet another case involving a stop, frisk and subsequent
arrest by DEA agent Paul Markonni at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport. Unlike the "typical" Detroit Metro Airport case, this
case does not involve a stop based on the much abused drug
courier profile, but presents a rare instance of an anonymous tip
providing the basis for the stop.147

Id. at 752.
United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 38, 40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (determining that "[t]he other
'suspicious' circumstances cited by the government, that the appellant was a female (it being
'common for females to carry narcotics on their person') and that she was traveling from Los
Angeles (it being known 'that Los Angeles, California is a major distribution area for Mexican
143

144

heroin') have little or no probative value").
145
However, after the Supreme Court issued Mendenhall in 1980, the 8th Circuit explicitly
condoned the use of race as a criterion of suspicion in an airport "drug courier profile" case:
Facts are not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleasant-and the
unpleasant fact in this case is that [the DEA agent] had knowledge, based upon
his own experience and upon the intelligence reports he had received from the

Los Angeles authorities, that young male members of black Los Angeles gangs
were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine. To that extent, then, race,
when coupled with the other factors [the agent] relied upon, was a factor in the
decision to approach and ultimately detain [the suspect]. We wish it were
otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to us, not as we would
like them to be.

United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992).
'4
600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1979).
147

Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
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The reason why Markonni's profile was "much abused" was because
DEA agents were stopping passengers based on factors that could not objectively
be viewed as suspicious, such as taking a taxi to the airportl48 or walking too
quickly 4 9 or too slowly through the airport.15 0 There is no denying that innocent
behavior is sometimes indicative of criminality. For example, the suspects in
Terry were also doing nothing illegal, but that officer could articulate why their
innocent actions-repeatedly walking by and peering into the display window of
jewelry store and then furtively conferring on a street corner-appeared to be
suspicious.1 5 ' The DEA agents, in contrast, were often unable to articulate
reasons for suspicion so the agents increasingly testified that judges should
simply defer to their "trained eye."' 5 2 The trend was best described in a Second
Circuit opinion, United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza,153 decided the same year
the Supreme Court issued its Mendenhall decision:
The line of cases in our Court from [Oates] to [Vasquez] has
resulted in a requirement of progressively fewer objective facts
to satisfy the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion. In
[Oates] the agent had prior knowledge of the suspect's drug
connections to use as a framework for evaluating unusual
behavior. In [Rico] there was no prior knowledge but, in addition
to the complex of suspicious or unusual behavior, the agent
noted the suspect's unnatural walk and tugging at her trousers,
facts which objectively can be viewed as indicating hidden
contraband. Still the [Rico] Court recognized that the facts only
"narrowly sufficed" to justify the stop. [Price], [VasquezSantiago], and [Vasquez], however,

contain

even fewer

objective facts linking the suspects to narcotics trafficking. As a
result, the agent's perception of objectively neutral conduct has
taken on an added importance. The "trained eye" of the narcotics
agent has loomed more prominently in our most recent analyses
of airport stops, as nervous behavior and perceived attempts by

United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing "the almost
exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport" as being
a criterion in Markonni's profile).
149
United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that agent testified that
he observed "the defendant leave the plane and walk hurriedly down the concourse").
1so
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (noting the agent testified that he
observed the defendant walking "very, very slowly" toward the baggage area).
1'
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
152
United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza. 615 F.2d. 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1980).
1
Id.
148
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passengers to appear "separate" have emerged as the principal
conduct justifying the stop. 1 54
B. Mendenhall'sRadical Reinterpretationof the Fourth Amendment
When the Supreme Court heard Mendenhall in 1980, it had the perfect
opportunity to end racially targeted dragnet policing. Mendenhall had also been
arrested in Detroit Metropolitan Airport, and the violation was so flagrant that
the Sixth Circuit ruled against the state in a two-sentence unpublished
decision.' 5 5 Agent Thomas Anderson and his partner approached Mendenhall
after she disembarked, asked to see her identification and ticket, noticed a
discrepancy in the ticketed name she was traveling under and her identification,
and then "asked" her to accompany them to their office. 6 The state did not argue
that the officers had probable cause to place Mendenhall under arrest.' 57
Anderson's testimony reveals why the prosecution was wise to concede this
issue:

Q:

When you first saw Sylvia Mendenhall, what drew your
attention to her was that she was a black woman traveling alone,
and she was the last to get off the airplane, is that right?
A: Additionally that she appeared to be very nervous as she
came off the airplane. 5 8
The Sixth Circuit's opinion contained no analysis. However, as the
Supreme Court explained, the lower court apparently had concluded that "the
agents' request that the respondent accompany them converted the situation into
an arrest requiring probable cause."' 5 9 The appellate court undoubtedly reached
that conclusion because the only way Mendenhall could have avoided going to

154
Id.; see also United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433, 440-41 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("The
government makes much of the skill, training, experience, and record of Agent Markonni and urges
that in the light of those considerations the facts articulated in justification of the intrusion here at
issue are to be imbued with a particular, added significance. . .. [T]he Court is not persuaded that

those accomplishments and qualities of Agent Markonni, even taking the government's
characterization of them at face value, are sufficient to elevate the impulse which led him to make
the stop here in issue from a mere, albeit educated hunch to the level of a prudent, reflective
ratiocination.").
155
Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari at 8a, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
(No. 78-5064). The appellate court subsequently granted the government's petition for an en banc
rehearing and again ruled in Mendenhall's favor in just seven sentences. Judge Weick issued a

short dissenting opinion. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979).
156
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48.
'57
Id. at 550 (The prosecution explicitly "concede[d] that its agents had neither a warrant nor
probable cause").
58
Appendix at 14, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (No. 78-1821).

15

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557.
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the office would have been to forcibly resist the officers. As Anderson conceded,
after they requested Mendenhall accompany them, she was no longer "free to
leave." 160
Mendenhall largely turned on whether the defendant had been subjected
to a "custodial interrogation." It is impossible to precisely define this term
because every arrest is fact specific. Perhaps the Court's most detailed attempt
to define "custodial interrogation" was offered in Miranda v. Arizona. 16 1
Miranda, a consolidated case involving four defendants, quoted from a police
manual to explain why a suspect should be understood as having been placed
under effective arrest once she has been taken into a private room for
questioning.1 62 "[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical," and the "principal
psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being
alone with the person under interrogation." 63 As one of the manuals explained,
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The
subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In
his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant.
He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell
of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of his
home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their
presence lending moral support. In his office, the investigator
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law. 6
Questioning Mendenhall in a private office without counsel closely
matched Miranda's definition of a custodial interrogation. And what happened
inside that office perfectly illustrates how police officers can coerce a frightened

160

Id. at 575 n.12. Agent Anderson gave the following testimony:

Q. All right. Now, when you asked her to accompany you to the DEA office
for further questioning, if she had wanted to walk away, would you have
stopped her?
A. Once I asked her to accompany me?
Q.

Yes.

A. Yes, I would have stopped her.
Q. She was not free to leave, was she?
A. Not at that point.
Id.

163

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 448-49.

16

Id. at 449-50 (quoting CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

161

162

99(1956)).
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defendant into complying with their "requests" in the absence of physical force.
Anderson testified that he and a second male agent took Mendenhall to a private
locked office with no other occupants. 65 The agent asked Mendenhall to take a
seat and then told her, "I would like your consent to search your person as well
as your handbag, and you have the right to decline this search if you so desire., 1 66
When Anderson asked Mendenhall for her "consent," he did not indicate
a female agent would conduct the search.16 7 It appears Mendenhall did not
understand the meaning of the term "your person," or she was so frightened that
she "consented" to be strip-searched alone in a locked office by two male agents.
A female officer was summoned, but Anderson again conceded he would have
"stopped" Mendenhall had she tried to leave the room where the search took
place.' 6 8 Stewart claimed Mendenhall had acted "voluntarily in a spirit of
apparent cooperation,"' 69 but she complained that she had a "plane to catch." 17 0
Mendenhall, in other words, had no choice but to submit to a strip search in a
situation in which the state conceded the officers lacked probable cause.' 7
Prior to Mendenhall, Fourth Amendment disputes naturally focused
exclusively on the suspect and the arresting officer. Did the suspect's behavior
objectively give rise to probable cause; did the officer legally 'seize" or "search"
the suspect? 17 2 If the Court in Mendenhall had applied this traditional approach
to Fourth Amendment adjudication, it would not have granted certioraribecause
conducting a strip search without probable cause is about as flagrant a violation
as one can imagine. This is why the Sixth Circuit's Mendenhall decision was just
two sentences long.' 73 No analysis was necessary.

'65
166
167

168

See Appendix at 12, 19, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (No. 78-1821).
Id. at 25.
See id.
Id. at 12-13, 21. Agent Anderson gave the following testimony:

Q.

Had she tried to leave that room when she was being accompanied by the
female officer, would you have known?

A. If she had attempted to leave the room?

Q.

Yes.

A. Well yes, I could say that I would have known.

Q.

And if she had tried to leave prior to being searched by the female officer,
would you have stopped her?

A. Yes.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 575 n.13.
169
170

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 549.
Id. at 559.

The prosecution "concede[d] that its agents had neither a warrant nor probable cause to
believe that the respondent was carrying narcotics." Id. at 550.
172
See infra text accompanying notes 228-29.
171

173

Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari at 8a, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (No. 78-5064).
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To understand how the Supreme Court arrived at a different conclusion,
we must refer back to the landmark Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,174 which
established the constitutionality of "consent" based searches in the absence of
probable cause.1 7 5 In sanctioning "consent" based searches, Schneckloth
demanded judges answer a new question: did the suspect voluntarily comply with
the arresting officer's "requests?"l 7 6 This question demands that judges shift
their focus from the objective actions taken by the police officer, to the subjective
reaction of the suspect.' 77 It constituted the first critical step in eviscerating
Fourth Amendment rights. A suspect may not have behaved in a manner giving
rise to probable cause but, if she consented to be stopped, interrogated and
searched, she has waived her constitutional rights.
In Mendenhall however, even under Schneckloth's novel approach to
Fourth Amendment adjudication, the application of the exclusionary rule was
still appropriate. The arresting officer testified that the defendant had been
effectively placed under arrest; 17 8 the prosecution conceded the agents had
lacked probable cause to do so; 179 and Mendenhall apparently felt she had to
comply with the officer's orders. 80
Justice White succinctly characterized the majority's opinion as simply
"unbelievable."' 81 He was dumbfounded that the majority could conclude "this
sequence of events involved no invasion of a citizen's constitutionally protected
interest in privacy."' 82 To make sense of Mendenhall, one must appreciate how
the ruling turned on a question unprecedented in the history of Fourth
Amendment adjudication. This new approach introduced a new hypothetical
actor into Fourth Amendment disputes.
The subtle but pivotal shift in the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is best illustrated by comparing Schneckloth with Mendenhall.
Both cases were authored by Justice Potter Stewart and both applied a "totality
of the circumstances" test. However, after Mendenhall,judges no longer viewed

412 U.S. 218 (1973).
See id.
176
Id. at 229 ("In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the
consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well
as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.").
174
175

177

Id.

See supra note 158.
179
See supra note 171.
18
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980) ("Evidently, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the respondent's apparent consent to the search was in fact not voluntarily
given and was in any event the product of earlier official conduct violative of the Fourth
Amendment.").
''
Id. at 577 (White, J., dissenting).
182
Id.
178
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these circumstances through the eyes of the suspect, but from the perspective of
a hypothetical "reasonable person."
[Schneckloth:] "In examining all the surrounding circumstances
to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account
must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the
possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who
83
consents."

[Mendenhall:] "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."' 8 4
Mendenhall's"reasonable person" doctrine does not immediately appear
to be a radical new concept because it is found throughout the law; tort law in
particular is dependent on it. However, focusing on a suspect's reaction as
opposed to an officer's action, makes the citizen, when confronted by armed
officers of the law, solely responsible for upholding her constitutional rights.
Prior to Mendenhall, the Court had never before restricted constitutional rights
to those citizens who could conform to a "reasonable person" standard. As noted,
the First Amendment protects our right to assert the most ridiculous arguments,
associate with the most illogical people, and pray to the silliest of deities.' 8 5 Some
might argue such a test is wholly appropriate in terms of the Second Amendment
because only "reasonable people" should have access to firearms. However, the
Fourth Amendment is different because a frightened citizen is being asked to
make a potentially life-altering decision upon a moment's notice when
confronted with the legal power of the state.
If a law enforcement agent uses polite language, "may I see your
identification," it becomes the responsibility of the citizen to determine whether
these five words constitute a request or an order. An incorrect determination may
lead to unfortunate consequences, as Eric Garner discovered when he was
arrested for selling loose cigarettes in Staten Island, New York.1 6 As his
surviving family members can attest, misinterpreting an order as a request may
result in resisting arrest charges, grievous bodily harm, and even death.' 87
Misinterpreting a request as an order, on the other hand, may result in an innocent
individual waiving her Fourth Amendment rights and submitting to stressful
183
184

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973) (emphasis added).
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).

See supra note 49.
Joseph Goldsetin & Nate Schweber, Man's Death After ChokeholdRaises Old Issuefor the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-islandman-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html.
187
See id.
185

186
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interrogations and demeaning searches. Moreover, as illustrated later in this
Article, the police are very much aware of how to manipulate the vulnerable
psychological state of a person confronting a police officer, an agent of the state
granted the legal authority to use physical force to control a suspect.' 8 8
Mendenhall's radical reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment may be
reduced to the following: if a law enforcement agent lacks probable cause to
seize a suspect, but does so nonetheless, and if that suspect subsequently
complies with the officer's requests, that suspect waives her rights under the
Fourth Amendment if a "reasonable person" would have believed she could have
refused the officer's "requests."
Mendenhall's "reasonable person" is such an unreasonable doctrine that
even an unapologetic racist might have had second thoughts after the Court's
second airport "drug courier profile" decision: Reid v. Georgia.189 The
underlying facts of Mendenhall and Reid were essentially identical. DEA agents
sought to detain Reid based on his conformity to the airport "drug courier
profile," and they also lacked the requisite level of reasonable suspicion to do
so.'" There was only one key factual difference. After the agents approached
him and identified themselves, Reid did what any "reasonable" person would do
in a similar situation. Reid ran as fast as his legs would carry him and
"abandoned" his cocaine-laden shoulder bag. 191 By fleeing, Reid precluded the
Court from finding he "voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation"l 92 had
consented to be stopped and searched. Since Reid indisputably had not "waived"
his constitutional rights, he received a favorable ruling from the Court.193
With Reid, the Supreme Court may have become the first adjudicatory
body in the history of mankind to reward criminal suspects for resisting arrest.
Perhaps the "reasonable person" doctrine survived nonetheless because the
overwhelming majority of Americans comply with police officers' "requests,"
only a small fraction demand to see a warrant or an attorney, and even fewer
resist arrest. The outcome in Reid thus could be ignored, and that case has been

88

See infra text accompanying notes 326-34.

189

448 U.S. 438 (1980).
.

'9
Id. at 441 ("We conclude that the agent could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably
suspected the petitioner of criminal activity . .

'1
192

1

Id. at 439.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549 (1980).
The Court issued a limited ruling in Reid. The lower court decision had been issued prior to

Mendenhall, and the lower courts had not considered the issue of whether the defendant had been
seized. Reid, 448 U.S. at 443 (Powell, J., concurring). The Supreme Court therefore also did not
consider that question, and it simply ruled that "the agent could not as a matter of law, have

reasonably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of these observed
circumstances." Id. at 441 (majority opinion). The case was remanded back to the Georgia Supreme
Court on that basis, and the state court then determined that there had in fact been no seizure. State

v. Reid, 276 S.E.2d 617, 622 (Ga. 1981). Had Reid first waited for the police to seize him, and
then attempted to run away, the exclusionary rule would presumably have been invoked.
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long forgotten. The importance of Mendenhall, on the other hand, can hardly be
overstated.
Mendenhall condoned racially targeted dragnet policing in an extreme
case: a woman had been stopped based almost entirely because of her race and
gender, interrogated in a private office, and strip-searched without probable
cause. The police conceded that she had no choice but to comply with all their
orders. One cannot help but wonder if the Court selected Mendenhall to be its
first airport "drug courier profile" case precisely because it involved such
flagrant constitutional violations. This would have sent a very clear message to
law enforcement officers and lower courts: "consent" based searches are
constitutionally permissible in all but the most egregious of cases. It may seem
unfathomable today that Justice Thomas could claim dragnet policing does not
exist in the United States, but Mendenhall demonstrates the Court has been
turning a blind eye to racially targeted dragnet policing for almost forty years.
The Court's intentional disingenuousness in these airport "drug courier
profile" cases is perhaps best illustrated by a particularly duplicitous rationale
asserted by two Justices in two different cases. Justice Powell in Mendenhall
made an argument that Rehnquist repeated three years later in Florida v.
Royer.1 94 "Few statistics have been kept on the effectiveness of 'profile' usage,"
Rehnquist wrote, "but the data available suggests it has been a success." 1 95 The
data Powell and Rehnquist both cited had first appeared in Van Lewis: "agents
have searched 141 persons in 96 airport encounters prompted by their use of the
courier profile and independent police work.... Agents found controlled
substances in 77 of the 96 encounters and arrested 122 persons for violations of
the narcotics laws."' 9 6
The figures appear impressive, but Justice White had completely
debunked this argument in his Mendenhall dissent when he explained that "there
is no indication that the asserted successes of the 'drug courier program' have
been obtained by reliance on the kind of nearly random stop involved in
[Mendenhall]."l97 In other words, the claim in Van Lewis that "[the] agents have
searched 141 persons in 96 airport encounters prompted by their use of the
courier profile and independent police work" conflates searches done as the
result of "independent police work" with searches resulting solely from a
passenger's conformity to the "drug courier profile." 1 98 It is possible that all 77
searches in which drugs were found resulted from "independent police work,"
and that all 19 cases in which innocent passengers were searched were triggered

194
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525 n.6 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring).
195
Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 n.6.
196
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 539 (E.D. Mich. 1976), reh'g denied, 556
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
197
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 573 n. I1 (White, J., dissenting).
198

See id.
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by the profile. Thus, the Van Lewis data could not be used to verify the
effectiveness of the stops in Mendenhall and Royer.
A second problem with relying on the Van Lewis data is that security
measures prior to 1973 had been so lax in airports that some drug couriers were
almost comically amateurish. During the first few years of the program, agents
described spotting drug couriers because they were walking through the airport
with an "unusual limp" or a "very obvious bulge" that turned out to be illegal
contraband.' 99 In other cases, individuals even tried to pass through metal
detectors with drugs or currency wrapped in aluminum foil. 20 0 However, it
appears criminals eventually became more sophisticated because agents in the
1980s and 1990s testified they were stopping roughly two to three people a day
and discovering drugs between two to five percent of the time. 20
Besides attempting to use discredited arrest data to mislead his reader,
Rehnquist also ignored the implications of another set of figures. It appears the
amount of drugs DEA agents were seizing rapidly diminished with the passage
of time. The DEA agents seized 66 pounds of heroin, 7 pounds of cocaine, and
189.5 pounds of marijuana at Detroit Metropolitan Airport in 1976.202 However,
in 1978, DEA agents seized just 10 pounds of heroin, 4.8 pounds of cocaine, and
47.5 pounds of marijuana. 203 It could be argued this illustrates the program was
successful, but it is unlikely the DEA thought so. Law enforcement officers are
generally rewarded for making big arrests. 2 04 The irony is that the number of

'
See, e.g., United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The agent
noticed 'distinct bulges' in the clothing of the suspect's traveling companion when the two men
returned to the airport after concluding their business in New York."); United States v. Roundtree,

596 F.2d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Roundtree had an unusual limp which drew Agent Markonni's
attention."); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883-884 (6th Cir. 1978) ("An additional salient
factor was an abnormal and obvious bulge around Appellant's abdomen, which in Agent Seward's

experience suggested that she was carrying illegal drugs.").
200
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating the
defendant passed through the metal detector with a "tinfoil-covered plastic envelope tightly packed
with white powder").
201
See United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (stating
that the arresting agent had testified that he had "detained 600 suspects in 1989" but arrested only
10); United States v. Moya, 561 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that an agent testified that

"he routinely approaches two or three people a day" but based on the number of arrests he had, he

estimated the stops had "result[ed] in arrests only 3-5% of the time").
202
United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 708 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Weick, J.,
dissenting).
203
Id.
204
See, e.g., Douglas A. Campbell & Howard Goodman, The Path to Gloryfor NJ Troopers:
Arrests, Arrests, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 7, 1999), http://crab.rutgers.edu/-goertzel/njtroopers.htm

("[T]he surest way to become 'trooper of the year' has been to make more drug arrests and seize
more contraband than anyone else. In 31 years, the award has gone 19 times to troopers who have
chalked up huge numbers of drug seizures or arrests.").
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people being searched in airports may have been rapidly increasing because the
percentage caught carrying illegal contraband was dramatically decreasing.
C. Stage Two ofRacial Profilingin America: Bus and Train Sweeps
Less is known about the second chapter of racially targeted dragnet
policing than any of the other three stages. Cases involving bus and train sweep
cases began appearing by 1984, and countless people were eventually subjected
to these searches.205 However, the media paid little attention. If more reporters
travelled Greyhound, perhaps the practice would have received more coverage.
There is also less information available on the bus sweeps because far
fewer cases were published as compared with the airport "drug courier profile."
A total of 140 published opinions involving the airport "drug courier profile"
were issued between 1976 and 1986.206 The Supreme Court issued Mendenhall
and Reid in 1980 and three more airport "drug courier profile" decisions before
the end of the decade.20 7 It is difficult to get an exact count on the number of
lower court decisions involving the bus and train sweeps. However, this Author
is currently writing a book on the history of racial profiling and, after three years
of research, it is clear that far more people were subjected to the bus and train
searches, but many fewer cases resulted. The Supreme Court heard only two:
Floridav. Bostick208 and United States v. Drayton.20 9
Fewer cases were published during the second stage of racially targeted
dragnet policing because convictions are increasingly obtained through pleabargaining. In fact, the advent of modem dragnet policing perfectly coincides
with the declining number of criminal trials. As noted, Van Lewis was published
in 1976.210 Beginning in 1977, the ratio of federal criminal defendants who opt
for ajury trial decreased from about 25% to just 3% in 2012.211 State felony cases
decreased from 8% in 1976 to just 2.3% by 2009.212 As noted more than 20 years

205

See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 460 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1984).

206

Charles L. Becton, The Drug CourierProfile: All Seems Infected That Th'Infected Spy, as

All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'dEye, 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 417 (1987).
207
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
208
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
209
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
210
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), reh'd denied, 556 F.2d
385 (6th Cir. 1977).
211
Matthew Clarke, Dramatic Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being Plea
Bargained,
PRISON
LEGAL
NEWS
(Jan.
15,
2013),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jan/I 5/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-

cases-being-plea-bargained/.
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ago, plea bargaining "is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system."2 13
Dragnet policing has also coincided with a second even more dramatic
change in the country's criminal justice system: the rise of mass incarceration.
As the reader will recall, Markonni was assigned to Detroit Metropolitan Airport
in 1974. From 1974 to 2009, America went from having one of the world's most
lenient criminal justice systems to having one of the harshest. The state and
federal prison populations during this period rose from 200,000 to 1.5 million. 2 14
Although the incarceration rate of all Americans increased dramatically, blacks
were incarcerated at six times and Latinos at three times the rate for non-Hispanic
whites. 2 1 5 As dragnet policing became more pervasive in America, considerably
more people were arrested, and the adjudicatory process necessarily became
more streamlined with plea-bargaining replacing jury trials.2 16
It appears dragnet policing at bus and train stations originated in Florida,
which has long been a premier entry point for illegal narcotics coming into the
United States. Local law enforcement agencies apparently conceived of the idea
after beginning "drug courier profile" details in Florida airports around the spring
of 1977.217 Dragnet searches on buses and trains passing through Florida were in
full swing by August 27, 1985. On that date, Terrance Bostick was arrested on a
Greyhound bus in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County. 2 18 Bostick reached the
Supreme Court 11 years after Mendenhall had been published. 2 19 Doctrinally, it
broke no new ground. The facts, as accepted by the lower courts as well as the
Supreme Court, were as follows:
On August 27, 1985, Terrance Bostick was a passenger on
a Greyhound bus traveling from Miami to Atlanta. While the bus
was stopped for a layover in Fort Lauderdale, it was boarded by

213

Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,

1912 (1992).
214

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014).
215
Id.

216

See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise ofPlea Bargaining in America, 57

STAN. L. REV. 1721 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY
OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)).
217

See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983) (stating that the defendant was spotted

at Miami International Airport by two plainclothes detectives of the Dade County, Florida, Public
Safety Department assigned to the county's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Investigation
Section); see also Reginald Stuart, Drug Squad Tell ofSuccess in Using Profile, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/28/us/drug-squad-tell-of-success-in-using1983),
28,

profile.html.
218

Michael J. Reed, Jr., Florida v. Bostick: The FourthAmendment Takes a Back Seat to the
Drug War, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 825, 836 (1993).
219

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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Officers Joseph Nutt and Steven Rubino of the Broward County
Sheriff s Department .... "Eyeing the passengers, the officers,
admittedly without articulable suspicion, picked out the
defendant passenger and asked to inspect his ticket and
identification." When the officers approached Bostick, he was
lying down on the very last bench-style seat at the rear of the
bus....
Officer Nutt asked Bostick if the red bag that he was using
as a cushion was his, and if so, could he have permission to
search it. . . . [F]ollowing the search of the red bag, Officer
Rubino noticed a blue bag in the overhead storage area near
Bostick. Again, Bostick was asked if he owned the bag and if he
would give permission for its search. . . . [According to the
police,] Bostick consented to the search of the blue bag and []
the search subsequently yielded 400 grams of cocaine.
Bostick's recollection of the event is somewhat different.
Bostick testified that he was asleep in the rear of the bus and that
he was woken up when something came in contact with his feet.
He soon discovered that it was, in fact, Officer Nutt. Officer Nutt
asked for his bus ticket and identification. Bostick stated that,
upon the officer's request, he consented to the search of the red
bag, but that he did not consent to the search of the blue bag.
Furthermore, Bostick denied that either officer ever informed
him that he had the right to decline their requests.22 0
The difference between the Florida Supreme Court's opinion and that of
the United States Supreme Court is startling. The former compared what was
happening in Broward County, Florida, to Nazi Germany:
[T]he evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days,
under other flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or
railways without fear of unwarranted interruption, by
individuals who held temporary power in the Government. The
spectre of American citizens being asked, by badge-wielding
police, for identification, travel papers-in short a raison
d'etre-isforeign to any fair reading of the Constitution, and its
guarantee of human liberties. This is not Hitler's Berlin, nor
Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South Africa. Yet
police officers
County, Florida, these
in Broward
and
trains
('that time
person
on
board
buses
approach every
ask
to search
check
identification,
tickets,
permits') and
cooperation'
with law
in
the
name
of
'voluntary
luggage-all
enforcement-to the shocking extent that just one officer,
Damiano, admitted that during the previous nine months, he,
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Reed, Jr., supra note 218, at 836-38.
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himself, had searched in excess of three thousand bags! In the
Court's opinion, the founders of the Republic would be
thunderstruck."2 2 1
The state court took the highly unusual step of adopting a per se rule
prohibiting a program which it claimed conjured up images of South African
apartheid. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion, on the other hand,
explained in the most anodyne language that the police can "approach"
individuals at "random" under Mendenhall's "reasonable person" doctrine:
We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police
officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and
other public places to ask them questions and to request consent
to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.222
The sentence above reveals the full ramifications of Mendenhall. It
begins by indirectly referring to Mendenhall as allowing for the police to
"approach" people at "random." 22 3 Random stops conducted on a large enough
scale by definition constitute "dragnet policing." Perhaps there is no exact agreed
upon number to define when dragnet policing begins, but the police by their own
admission were stopping and searching as many people in the bus sweeps as time
permitted.22 4 The second half of O'Connor's sentence illustrates how
Mendenhall supplanted the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment with a "reasonable person" doctrine.
The issue in Bostick, as O'Connor explained, was "whether the same rule
applies to police encounters that take place on a bus."2 2 5 The answer is obvious.
If random "encounters" are permissible in airports, they must also be permissible
on buses. 22 6 If the police may ask one woman to "agree" to be strip searched,
they may make the same request of all Americans. The Constitution does not
protect the rights of groups; it protects the rights of the individual.
The bus and train sweeps thus differed little from the airport stops. While
it is true that DEA agents rarely if ever boarded planes, it is obviously easier to
hop off a bus than an airplane; it is also easier to access a passenger's luggage on
a bus or a train. 227 However, these are not legal issues, they are logistical

221
Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989) (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d
347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987)).
222
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (emphasis added).
223
224

Id. at 434.
Id. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Id. at 431.
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Id.

See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494 (1983) (stating that the agents had to retrieve
the suspect's luggage from the airline).
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considerations. Thus, Justice Thurgood Marshall was wrong to argue the scale
of the bus sweeps rendered them unconstitutional:
These sweeps are conducted in "dragnet" style. The police
admittedly act without an "articulable suspicion" in deciding
which buses to board and which passengers to approach for
interviewing. By proceeding systematically in this fashion, the
police are able to engage in a tremendously high volume of
searches.... (single officer employing sweep technique able to
search over 3,000 bags in nine-month period). The percentage
of successful drug interdictions is low. .. . (sweep of 100 buses
resulted in seven arrests).2 28
Rather than focusing on the number of people subjected to random stops,
Marshall should have made the broader argument that the "reasonable person"
doctrine is incompatible with traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. He should
have vociferously rejected O'Connor's claim, as quoted below, that
Mendenhall's reasonable person doctrine is compatible with Terry:
The dissent reserves its strongest criticism for the proposition
that police officers can approach individuals . .. and ask them

potentially incriminating questions. But this proposition is by no
means novel; it has been endorsed by the Court any number of
times. Terry, Royer, Rodriguez, and Delgado are just a few
examples. As we have explained, today's decision follows
logically from those decisions and breaks no new ground.
Unless the dissent advocates overruling a long, unbroken line of
decisions dating back more than 20 years, its criticism is not well
taken.2 29

Mendenhall's "reasonable person" test, and the subsequent cases which
adopted it, are completely at odds with Terry. Terry explicitly warned against
adopting any judicially constructed tests to govern Fourth Amendment analysis
because arrests are always fact specific: "there is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."' 23 0 Rather than using a test, Terry
stated the police officer must simply be able to articulate why the suspect's
behavior could be viewed as suspicious: "And in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 439 (majority opinion).
230
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53435, 536-37 (1967)).
228
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warrant that intrusion." 2 3 1 Yet the prosecutors in Mendenhall did not even
attempt to argue that the DEA agents had acted upon probable cause.
By the time the search in Bostick took place, Terry's demand of
articulable suspicion had become so inconsequential that the police had even
dispensed with the pretense of a "profile." In the earliest bus and train cases,
officers claimed the suspects actions had conformed to a "profile."2 32 However,
this rationale was not raised in Bostick. Perhaps officers abandoned their
"profile" after they began barging into sleeping compartments, as happened in
Fort Lauderdale:
The officers had no warrant to search any part of the train and
no articulable reason to believe that any passenger on the train
might be transporting illegal drugs. The officers knocked on the
door of the private sleeping compartment occupied by Alvarez,
who was lying in bed in his stocking feet. After he opened the
door, the officers positioned themselves in the doorway partially
blocking the exit. The officers then identified themselves and
and obtained Alvarez' train ticket and
requested
identification.23 3
These bus and train sweeps undoubtedly constituted a form of dragnet
policing, and there is strong reason to suspect that minorities were again targeted.
Some officers in other cases testified that they had focused on the suspects
because "they were young and black" or that "[they] knew that the couriers, more
often than not, were young black males." 2 34 As Marshall suggested, "the basis of
the decision to single out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is
less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable." 23 5
D. Stage Three ofRacial Profilingin America: OperationPipeline

The third stage of racially targeted dragnet policing may be traced back
to an exact time and location. On June 5, 1985, at 3:00 a.m., Florida Highway
Patrol ("FHP") Trooper Bob Vogel's marked patrol car was sitting on the median
231

Id.
See State v. Bullock, 460 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1984). (Although the
word "profile" does not appear in Bullock, the judge listed the same behavioral criteria found in
the airport "drug courier profile" cases: "(a) the defendant was traveling under an assumed name,
(b) the defendant denied that the luggage in question was his, although he had been
previously observed by the police arriving at the station in a taxicab in possession of the luggage,
(c) the defendant claimed that someone else present nearby owned the luggage, although no one
else was in the lobby area of the station, and (d) the defendant was extremely nervous during his
consensual encounter with the police").
233
Alvarez v. State, 515 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
234
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
235
Id. (emphasis omitted).
232
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of Interstate 95.236 Vogel was using its headlights to illuminate northbound
vehicles so he could observe the occupants. 237 Vogel spotted two individuals in
their thirties travelling at 50 mph in a car with out-of-state plates. 238 United States
v. Smith 2 39 marks the advent of the third stage of racial profiling in America. It
is the first published case involving Vogel and the use of his "drug courier
profile."2 40
There is no doubt that Vogel considered a motorist's race to be a criterion
of suspicion. Local newspapers declared Vogel "looks for a black man in his
early 30s who dresses casually and drives an out of state rental car north on 1-95
at or below the speed limit;" 2 4 1 and that Vogel's drug smuggler is "usually a
black man in his early 3Os.",242 Other troopers conceded in trial testimony "that
the profile targets black men between 20 and 50.",243 In March, 1986, a copy of
Vogel's profile was published by the Orlando Sentinel.2 " Before looking at the
profile, the reader is invited first to guess how many of the twelve criteria would
be triggered by the following hypothetical scenario. At 8:00 p.m., a casually
dressed 30-year-old black male, with no passengers, is spotted driving north on
1-95, at or below the speed limit:
Rental cars[;]
Out-of-state tags[;]
Traveling north on I-95[;]
At or slower than the speed limit[;]
From 6:30 p.m. to 4:30 a.m. Peak hour is 3 a.m.[;]
Occupied by one or two people; two is most common[;]
Mean age: 32[;]
Sixty percent blacks, 40 percent others[;]
Nearly all males[;]

237

United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 705-06 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id.

238

Id. at 706.

239

799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
See id.
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240

241
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1, 1986), http://articles.sun-
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Al Truesdell, Prosecutor: Drug Profile Ruling Won't Affect Volusia, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(June 29, 1985), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1985-06-29/news/0310150230_1 volusiacounty-drug-courier-profile-palm-beach.
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Usually casually dressed[;]
Nervous behavior, such as hands shaking[;] and
Vehicle weaving. 24 5
Although Vogel usually worked alone, a DEA agent was with him when
he stopped Smith.246 Vogel and the federal agent were working on a "special
operation to intercept drug couriers on Interstate 95.247 That "special operation"
was, no doubt, the origins of Operation Pipeline, a DEA training program, which
taught local law enforcement agencies in 48 states to use a "drug courier profile"
to identify motorists who might be transporting narcotics. 2 4 8 The program
included a training video also named Operation Pipeline, in which 29 of the 30
traffickers depicted were Latinos. 2 4 9 According to most accounts, Vogel "was
the creator" of the program's "modus operandi;" 2 50 he personally claims to have
been its "inspiration;" 25 ' and he conducted training classes for the DEA.252 He
spoke at the official launch of the program, 2 5 3 and he may even have helped
produce the infamous Operation Pipeline video because he has said he "created
a video that became a prominent training tool" for the DEA.254 Ultimately, the
DEA trained some 27,000 officers across the country in how to use Vogel's
techniques.2 55
Since law enforcement in the United States is so decentralized, and
agencies maintain independent record keeping policies, there are no national
statistics available regarding Operation Pipeline. It is known that California
patrol units made 34,000 stops in 1997.256 It also appears that the program was
no more effective than the first two stages of racially targeted dragnet policing.
A state investigator who participated in the program reported that drugs were

245

Id.
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 705-06 (11th Cir. 1986).
247
Id. at 705.
248
David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues that the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race Profiling,
N.Y. TiMEs (Nov. 29, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/29/nyregion/new-jersey-arguesthat-the-us-wrote-the-book-on-race-profi ling.html.
249
N.J. Black and Latino Caucus, A Report on DiscriminatoryPracticesWithin the New Jersey
State Police, 26 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 273, 288 (2002).
250
David M. Tanovich, Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an
Equality-Based Conception ofArbitrary Detention, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 145, 151 n.24 (2002).
251
DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 22 (2002).
252
Id.
246
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ROB VOGEL WITH JEFF SADLER, FIGHTING TO WIN

67 (2001).
Id. at 61.
255
Gary Webb, Driving While Black, F*QUIRE (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Driving While
Black], http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a 1223/driving-while-black-0499/.
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being discovered in just two to five percent of the searches made in various
states.2 57

Operation Pipeline relied on the procedure of using minor traffic
violations as a pretext to stop motorists, but when Vogel developed its techniques
he first experimented with stopping drivers purely on the basis of his "profile."
"For six weeks in 1985," according to the Orlando Sentinel, "Vogel, with
approval from his department and the state attorney's office in Volusia, made
stops based solely on the profile to see if the profile would stand up in court." 258
It was during this period that Vogel made the stop that led to Smith, and he
testified that it was an "investigative stop" for drugs based purely on the
motorist's conformity to his profile.2 59
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Smith makes an interesting contrast
with the Supreme Court's decision in Mendenhall. The term had yet to be
invented, but in both cases the defense essentially alleged that the police had
engaged in racial profiling. In Mendenhall, Stewart constructed the "reasonable
person" test and sanctioned the program. The Eleventh Circuit, in comparison,
thought it more appropriate to require the police to act reasonably, and therefore
they applied a "reasonable officer" standard.
The Eleventh Circuit wrote in Smith that "in determining when an
investigatory stop is unreasonably pretextual, the proper inquiry . . is not
whether the officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonableofficer would have made the stop in the absence of
the invalid purpose." 2 60 The Smith court correctly predicted that if it were to
uphold Vogel's methods, "police officers could easily make the random,
arbitrary stops denounced in Terry."2 6 1 The problem with permitting pretext
stops would be that "[w]ith little more than an inarticulate 'hunch' of illegal
activity an officer could begin following a vehicle and then stop it for the
slightest deviation from a completely steady course." 2 62
In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit decided a second case involving Vogel,
United States v. Miller.2 6 3 In Miller, the prosecutors argued Vogel had stopped a
motorist because of an alleged traffic violation.264 Vogel had testified that Miller
had "allowed his right wheels to cross over the white painted lane marker about

257

Id.

Al Truesdell, FHP Can't Stop Cars on Hunch Appeal Court Restricts Drug Courier
Profile,
ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(Apr.
17,
1987),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/I 987-04258

17/news/0 120270245 1 drug-courier-profile-highway-patrol-drug-smugglers.
259
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1986).
260
Id. at 709 (emphasis added and omitted).
261

Id. at 711.
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821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 547.
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four inches" after he had changed lanes.265 The court held that Smith controlled
and the stop in Miller was therefore unconstitutional.266 The major difference
between Smith and Miller is that Miller signed a consent form allowing Vogel to
search his vehicle.267
The government maintained that the consent "excuses the unreasonable
stop and sufficiently attenuates the taint of the search so as to legitimate the
search." 2 6 8 Thus, Miller was very similar to Strieff 269 The prosecution argued
that the illegal drugs discovered after an illegal stop should be admitted into
evidence under the attenuation doctrine. However, the argument that there had
been no intervening circumstance prevailed in Miller.27 0 The Eleventh Circuit,
quoting Supreme Court precedent, ruled that a traffic stop is an "unsettling show
of authority" that may "create substantial anxiety." 27 1 It held that the consent
form was "invalid" because there was "no significant lapse of time between the
unlawful detention and the consent," and no "intervening circumstances
dissipated the effect of the unlawful detention." 272
Miller illustrates how many lower courts initially resisted adopting
Mendenhall's "reasonable person" test to determine the constitutionality of
consent based searches. The Eleventh Circuit also demonstrated a concern that
had escaped the attention of the Supreme Court in its airport "drug courier
profile" cases. How many innocent people were being stopped?
The record does not reveal how many unsuccessful searches
Trooper Vogel has conducted or how many innocent travelers
the officer has detained. Common sense suggests that those
numbers may be significant. As well as protecting alleged
criminals who are wrongfully stopped or searched, the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects these innocent citizens
as well.273
Dragnet policing is based on volume, not suspicion, and the leaders of
Operation Pipeline were surprisingly candid about this. The key to the program,
a veteran sergeant explained, is "sheer numbers . . .. Our guys make a lot of
stops. You've got to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince." 2 7 4 Operation

265
266
267
268
269

270
271
272
273

274

Id.
Id. at 549.
See id. at 550.
Id. at 549.
See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Id. at 550.
Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Driving While Black, supra note 255.
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Pipeline supervisors encouraged troopers to make at least eight to 10 stops a
day. 2 7 5
Ironically, Vogel explains in his autobiography that while he was
constructing his "profile" he considered setting up a narcotics roadblock but
decided against the idea because roadblocks are "intrusive" and would result in
"stopping a great number of innocent people and delaying them
unnecessarily." 276 Thus, in order to avoid inconveniencing the general
population, Vogel was considerate enough to target only certain types of people.
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the majority of federal appellate courts
eventually upheld the constitutionality of pretext stops. 27 7 These courts, in other
words, adopted the "could have" test, rather than the Eleventh Circuit's "would
have" test. However, the problem judges confronted with pretext stops was
considerably more difficult to adjudicate than the first two stages of dragnet
policing.
An officer who witnesses a traffic violation has probable cause to stop
the motorist, and the "'multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations'
is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of
violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a
stop." 2 78 Traffic regulations can be exploited by the police to selectively enforce
generally unenforced laws. However, to regulate this type of state action, a judge
must question the subjective intent of a police officer. It is not clear this is even
possible.
The inability ofjudges to control the police was illustrated when "20/20"
ran a segment on Vogel after he had been elected Volusia County Sheriff in
1988.279 Although the Eleventh Circuit had already ruled against profile stops in
Smith and struck down pretext stops in Miller, it was abundantly clear that
Vogel's men were still stopping motorists because of factors unrelated to traffic
violations. Moreover, Sheriff Vogel permitted his men to be filmed on national
television while doing so. His men never said race was a factor in their decision
to stop a motorist, but as one officer explained, they focused on two somewhat

275
Gary Webb, Operation Pipeline: Pulling Over Minority Motorists as an Excuse to Search
Their Cars, in ABUSE YOUR ILLUSIONS 149 (Russ Kick ed., 2003).
276
VOGEL, supra note 253, at 49-50.
277

See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245-47 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Jeffus,

22 F.3d 554, 556-57 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Meyers, 990 F.2d
1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d
1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987).
278
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
279

The 20/20 episode is available on YouTube. 20/20, Drug Interdiction on Volusia County
in Early 1990's Sheriff Robert Vogel, YOUTUBE (Mar.
19, 2011),

Roadways

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2NyRIC-gzk.

All dialogue from this episode has been

transcribed by this Author.
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indistinguishable indicators: "We'll get a person that doesn't actually match a
car, or a car doesn't match a person." 280
At one point during the segment, a trooper is seen sitting on the side of
a highway; watching an endless stream of cars passing by. As the cars rush past
the patrol car, the reporter can be heard asking with disbelief, "Sitting on the
interstate, watching cars whizz by, one or two a second, how do they know which
ones to stop?" 2 8 1Vogel then appears on screen and he responds by saying, "Well,
Deputies stop vehicles based on a traffic violation." "But Sheriff, just about
everybody is out there speeding . . going 60, 65 miles an hour, doesn't it give
you a broad mandate. ... ?"28 The reporter never suggests the troopers are using
a profile, but Vogel's Freudian slip of a convoluted reply certainly raises that
possibility: "Well I'm not certainly stating, or denying the fact that, our personnel
are using a profile of any sort, which they do." 283
E.

Whren and Tacticsfor CriminalPatrol

The Supreme Court resolved the federal circuit split over the use of
pretext stops in Whren v. United States. 284 In Whren, the police observed an SUV
sitting at a stop sign for an "unusually long time." 285 The SUV then made a turn
without signaling and sped off at "an unreasonable" speed.286 After the officers
stopped the truck, they observed plastic bags of what appeared to be crack
cocaine in Whren's hands.287 Thus, Whren's arrest was based on the plain view
exception to the Fourth Amendment and the constitutionality of the search was
not at issue.
The officers who stopped Whren were undercover narcotic officers
driving an unmarked vehicle.288 Under local police regulations they were
prohibited from enforcing traffic laws unless the violation was "so grave as to
pose an immediate threat to . . others." 289 Two officers, Ephraim Soto, and
Homer Littlejohn, testified at the suppression hearing. Soto stated under oath that
he and his fellow vice-squad officers stopped the SUV not to issue a ticket, but

280
281

Id.
Id.

282

Id.

283

Id.
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Id. at 808.

284
285
286

Id.
Id. at 808-09.
288
Id. at 808.
289
See D.C. METRO. POLICE DEP'T, GENERAL ORDER 303.1(I)(A)(2)(A)(4)
https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_303_01.pdf.
287
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to ask why the driver had stopped at the stop sign for such a long time and just
"to talk to him."
The only circumstances that I would issue tickets-I'm a vice
investigator; I'm not out there to give tickets-is just for
reckless, reckless driving, something that in my personal view
would somehow endanger the safety of anybody who's walking
around the street or even the occupants of a vehicle, maybe
children or whoever .... I wasn't going to issue a ticket to him
at all. That was not my intention at all. My intentions [sic] was
to pull him over and talk to him.2 90
Defense counsel then asked: "Isn't it true that your decision to stop that
Pathfinder was because you believed that two young black men in a Pathfinder
with temporary tags were suspicious; isn't that true?" 2 9 1 It is unclear exactly how
long Officer Soto paused before answering this question; perhaps as long as the
Pathfinder had sat at the stop sign. In any event, Soto's pause also raised
suspicions, and the judge asked him why he had "hestitate[d] a long time" before
answering that "very straightforward question."2 92 Soto stated that he had
"wanted to really think" and "analyze the question." 29 3 Interestingly, when he
finally answered, Soto did the same thing Vogel had done on "20/20." He
defended himself against an accusation that had not been alleged. Soto denied
the stop was based on a "racial profile."2 94 Soto's partner, Officer Littlejohn, had
an easier time on the witness stand. He simply admitted that they had stopped
the Pathfinder to investigate for drugs. 2 9 5 "Sir, they were leaving a high drug
area. We did not know they had drugs in that vehicle at that time, just had a
reasonable suspicion as to their actions as to why they were stopped at the stop
sign for so long." 2 96
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing the trial judge ruled the stop
was constitutional because "[t]here was nothing to really demonstrate that the
actions of the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop." 29 7 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, ruling that the district
court judge had chosen the appropriate test to determine whether traffic stops

290
Brief for Petitioner at 14, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 95-5841)
(omission in original).
291
Id. at 19 n.11.
292
293
294
295
296
297

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13 n.7.
Id.
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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were constitutional. 2 98 The appellate court argued that the advantage of the

"could have" test is that "it eliminates the necessity for the court's inquiring into
an officer's subjective state of mind."

2 99

But if this is true, it seems fair to ask:

why was the only issue in Whren the arresting officer's subjective state of mind?
The Supreme Court's decision in Whren quickly "launched a firestorm
of virtually unanimous criticism." 30 0 "Most legal scholars have excoriated" it for
being "legally incorrect, technically flawed, and fundamentally unfair." 3 01
However, the importance of Whren has been greatly exaggerated. Unlike the first
two stages of racial profiling, it is far from clear how judges can prevent racial
profiling on the highways. As the 20/20 profile on Vogel illustrated, the
"reasonable officer" test was largely if not completely ineffective because it
demands that judges second guess an officer's subjective motivations. A study
of Washington State offers empirical evidence of the test's futility.
Three years after Whren, the Washington State Supreme Court adopted
the reasonable officer test based on its interpretation of its state constitution. 30 2
In 2009, a scholar concluded, based on her review of almost 10 years of available
case law, that
Washington courts rarely seem to find that an officer acted for
pretextual reasons unless the officer either testifies to her use of
pretext or the court finds that the officer is lying about the
reasons for the stop, both of which are relatively uncommon.
While, on the one hand, this might suggest that the use of pretext
by the police is less prevalent than thought, it could also suggest
that courts are reluctant to pick apart an officer's motivations for
making a stop, with the possible accompanying risk of elevating
a pretextual motive over a valid, constitutional one, and
suppressing validly recovered evidence. 3 03
Although reviewing almost a decade of traffic stop case law is certainly
an impressive feat, the 15-minute segment on Sheriff Vogel broadcast by "20/20"
had already proven the point. Vogel's men were obviously still targeting
minority motorists, and this fact became indisputable after the Orlando Sentinel

298
299

300

Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 375.
Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the 'Would Have' Test Work?,

57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 917 (2008).
301
Id. at 917-18 (internal citations omitted); see also Honorable Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A.
Daly, State ConstitutionalAnalysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597 (1999).
302
State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (Wash. 1999).
303
See Lawton, supra note 300, at 957.
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later obtained and reviewed police recorded videotapes of 1,084 stops. 3 04
According to a contemporaneous study of the stretch of 1-95 patrolled by Vogel's
men, roughly 5% of the motorists were "dark-skinned." 3 05 However, 69% of the
motorists stopped on the videotapes were black or Hispanic, 82% of the motorists
searched were black or Hispanic, and only 9 of the 1084 drivers stopped, less
than 1%, received traffic tickets. 306 Vogel and his men were obviously undeterred
by the "reasonable officer" test.
Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of the "would have" test, as well
as the scale of racially targeted dragnet policing in the United States, is found in
the above mentioned police training manual, Tactics.3 07 Tactics has been used by
law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, 3 08 and is widely considered a
classic in the field. 3 0 9 Remarkably, Strieff is the first published case, federal or
state, to refer to it. 3 10 In addition, of the countless law review articles available
on Lexis, only one (as of the date of this writing) has previously referred to it,
and that reference is buried in a footnote. 3 1 1
Not only does Tactics instruct officers on how to make pretext stops, but
it also offers advice on how to conceal that practice. In a section entitled "How
can I protect myself against accusations of profiling or pretextual stops," the
manual instructs officers to maintain a written log of all these stops so if "you're
accused of profiling or [pretextual] stops, you can bring your daily logbook to
court and document that pulling over motorists for 'stickler' reasons is part of
your customary pattern-not a glaring exception conveniently dusted off in the
defendant's case." 3 12 In other words, the best defense against a racial profiling
allegation is to practice racial profiling on a regular and consistent basis.

3

Henry Pierson Curtis, Statistics Show Pattern ofDiscrimination,ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug.

23,
1992), http://articles.orIandosentinel.com/1992-08-23/news/9208230488_1_drug-squadblack-and-hispanic-traffic-stops.
305

Id.

Id.; see also Steve Berry & Jeff Brazil, Blacks, Hispanics Big Losers in Cash Seizures,
ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(June
15,
1992),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-06306

15/news/9206150311_1_seizures-arrest-vogel; Jeff Brazil, Videotape Gives a Look at Volusia
Squad's Tactics, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 17, 1992), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-0617/news/92061704711 _drivers-sentinel-stop-a-car.
307
REMSBERG, supra note 46.
308
See Epp, supra note 38 (citation omitted).
309
Preliminary Expert Witness Report of Robert C. Willis at 6, J.G. v. Lingle, No. 13-cv-414sic, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120058 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2014).
310
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Tactics for
its advice that "officers looking for drugs to 'run at least a warrants check on all drivers you stop"').
311
Seth Stoughton, EvidentiaryRulings as Police Reform, 69 U. MIAMI L. REv. 429,456 n.139
(2015).
312

REMSBERG, supra note 46, at 70.
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Tactics also offers informative advice regarding the "could have" test by
summarizing the level of discretion permitted by the test: "Is it legal to be curious
about a car or driver first, then find a traffic infraction to justify pulling him over
so I can make contact and check him out? Most places, yes." 3 13 Moreover, since
virtually all motorists commit traffic violations every time they drive, officers
are advised to acquire an "intimate and resourceful working knowledge of the
motor vehicle codes, as well as knowing the outer limits of what prosecutors and
courts in your jurisdiction will stand for." 314 The manual lists a few helpful
examples of "more trivial [traffic] infractions" that will justify a stop: "having a
taillight out or a cracked windshield, changing lanes without signaling, impeding
traffic, following too closely, failing to dim lights, speeding 3 to 5 mph over the
limit . . . and so on." 315 As an Operation Pipeline instructor once proclaimed, "the
vehicle code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to pull you over." 316 Another
officer, who apparently had mastered the vehicle code as well as the "outer
limits" of what judges in his jurisdiction would stand for, even more memorably
declared: "I've got that supercharged knowledge of the Constitution that allows
me to do this right." 3 17
Although the constitutionality of the search in Whren was not disputed,
few drug couriers greet police officers while holding two bags of cocaine in their
hands. Thus, the challenge facing an officer after making a pretext stop is how
to effect a search in the absence of probable cause. Fortunately, Tactics also
offers illuminating advice on how to gain a motorist's consent to be searched
after a "trivial" traffic violation stop. The "Consent to Search" chapter begins
with the proud declaration that various troopers have between a 96% and 100%
success rate in getting motorists to grant them consent."' The rate is so high
because "The reasonsfor giving consent are not affected by logic."319 Tellingly,
the manual criticizes those officers who "try to search every vehicle they stop, as
a hedge against offenders who are successfully deceptive during dialogue"
because it is "generally a waste of valuable time."32 0
Tactics also teaches an important lesson apparently gleaned from the
Supreme Court's airport drug courier "profile" decisions. In Mendenhall, after
the agent had stopped the defendant and saw that the name on her ticket did not
match her identification, he returned the driver's license and airline ticket and

314

Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.

31s

Id.

3

Driving While Black, supra note 255.
Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMEs MAG. (June 20, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/20/magazine/the-color-of-suspicion.html.
3
REMSBERG, supra note 46, at 211.
316

317
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Id.

320

Id. at 213.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

514

[Vol. 120

asked Mendenhall "if she would accompany him to the airport DEA office for
further question[ing]." 3 2 1 In Royer, where the stop was ruled unconstitutional,
the detectives also stopped the defendant and discovered the name on his ticket
did not match his identification. 32 2 However, these officers did not return the
documents before interrogating him. And, Justice White, who wrote the Royer
decision, explained "the detectives' possession of Royer's airline ticket and their
retrieval and possession of his luggage made it clear . . that Royer was not free
to leave." 323 Tactics incorporates this lesson in its detailed instruction on what is
called "The Magic Moment." 324
Consent must be asked for and granted when a "reasonable"
person would believe he is legally free to disregard further
contact with you and leave your presence.

. .

. Legally this

period begins when you have concluded the reason for the stop
(issued him a ticket or warning, for example) and have returned
his license, registration, insurance card, and any other
documents.... You may want to mark the end of your official
detention by saying casually, as a "throw-away line:" "Okay,
you're free to go, have a safe trip," as you hand him the
papers .

. .

. [Most] courts presume that a reasonable citizen

knows that constitutionally he does not have to remain once the
purpose for the stop is ended. If he does stay after that point, it's
presumed he's sticking around by "choice" and engaging in
"consensual conversation" with you. Whatever he agrees to
then, in the courts' view, is more likely to be voluntary. 3 2 5
Remsberg explains how most officers seek to avoid an "abrupt break
when the detention technically ends and the contact de-escalates into a voluntary
encounter." 3 26 They do so by keeping "the conversation flowing as they're filling
out the paperwork" and when giving the documents back to the driver.3 27 As an
example, Remsberg quotes an officer who liked to ask about "the weather in
whatever locale the suspect says he has come from. ..."328 The advantage is that
this keeps the driver "focused on something nonthreatening at that moment."

321
322

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548 (1980).
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1983).

323

Id. at 496.

324

REMSBERG, supra note
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46, at 211.
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Such a "seamless" transition makes the "suspect [] less likely to register the fact
that his status has officially changed." 32 9
Psychologically though, the chances are overwhelming that the
average person won't leave at that "break" point, even if he
understands intellectually that he could. After all you're the
police and you're still talking to him. As a practical matter, his
freedom to disregard your questions and split simply don't [sic]
occur to him.330
Another technique is to "pretend the idea of searching has occurred to
you as an afterthought." 33 1
If you're at the driver's window or standing outside with him,
turn as if you're going to walk away after you've returned his
papers, then, still acting the good ol' boy, turn back and broach
the subject cordially, [] almost as a joke: 'Say can I ask you a
question?' Wait for him to agree, then: 'You know, I sure run
into a lot of strange things out here. You don't have any
bazookas or drugs or atomic bombs in the car, do you?"
Technically, you've confirmed that he's agreeable to talking to
you. Your tone conveys that you're posing a strictly routine,
even stupid, question to which you are of course expecting a
negative answer. When the driver says "No," then casually but
quickly pop the $64,000 question:
"Well, you wouldn't mind if I took a look, would you?"
This phrasing, too, employs psychology in your favor. The
implication is that the subject will look guilty if he does mind.
An assumption is built into the question. It's psychologically
harder to decline than a straight-forward: "Can I search your
car."

332

Six more pages of psychological advice are offered to gain consent in
more specific types of circumstances. An interesting question is that of who
pioneered this approach to gaining a motorists' consent to search their vehicle.
The first published mention of these methods that this author has seen occurred
in 1992 after the Orlando Sentinel reviewed videotapes of more than 1,000 stops
that had been recorded by Sheriff Vogel's men. 3 33 A typical stop was described
as follows:

329
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 215-16.
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In the tape, [Officer] Jones informs each driver that he or she
has been stopped for a minor traffic violation and asks to see a
driver's license. He is polite and chatty and returns the license
before popping the surprise question: "By the way, you're not
carrying any drugs, guns or bombs, are you?" he asks. "You
mind if I take a quick look?" 334
TV. STOP AND FRISK IN NEW YORK CITY

When one considers the facts of Mendenhall, Bostick and Whren, it is
rather astounding that the Supreme Court managed to avoid a public debate over
racial profiling until 2016.335 Moreover, even when the issue was finally
addressed in Strieff the majority still disputed indisputable facts. Justice Thomas
discounted any danger of "dragnet searches" because such "wanton conduct
would expose police to civil liability." 336 Yet, as we have seen, police officers
participating in Operation Pipeline and the Florida bus sweeps had previously
acknowledged that their programs were based on "sheer numbers" 33 7 or stopping
as many people as "time permits." 3 3
No one expected that the Court would debate racial profiling in Strieff,
but Justice Sotomayor realized the significance of two critical facts. First, even
the prosecution had conceded that there was insufficient legal basis for the
arresting officer to have stopped the defendant. 3 3 9 Therefore, the Court was
considering extending the type of random stops or "encounters," which it had
previously permitted in airports and on buses, to pedestrians. Second, running a
warrant check on people suspected of committing a minor infraction or, in many
cases, having committed no criminal wrongdoing whatsoever, has become a
common strategy in today's new system of "mass misdemeanor" justice.340
The strategy was originated by the NYPD in 1994, when it decreed that
all summonses would be backed by a warrant. 341 The aggressive use of stop-andfrisk has proven to be the principle tool used to increase arrests for low-level

23, 1992), http://articles.oriandosentinel.com/1992-08-23/news/9208230486
traffic-stops.
334

l_1awyer-seizures-
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3

See generally Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).

336

Id.
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See Driving While Black, supra note 255.

338
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Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989).
See Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2063.

3o

See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJusticeand Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REv.

611, 614 (2014).
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See NYPD, POLICE STRATEGY No. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YoRK 42
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offenses. 342 Thus, Justice Sotomayor recognized how, by upholding the stop in
Strieff the Court would essentially sanction the latest form of racially targeted
dragnet policing. In this section of the Article, we will first examine the origins
and theory underlying stop-and-frisk policing. Afterwards, we will turn our
attention to the toll stop-and-frisk has taken on its targeted population. Finally,
we will explore whether stop-and-frisk can be justified as an effective crime
fighting measure.
A.

Stage Four ofRacial Profiling in America: Stop-and-Frisk

Stop-and-frisk, as an institutionalized proactive crime fighting tool, was
first implemented after Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner
William Bratton were sworn into office on January 1, 1994.343 At the time, New
York City was in the midst of a crime wave which had lasted more than three
decades. 3 " Crime figures are notoriously unreliable, but criminologists agree
that the most reliable statistics relate to homicide. 3 4 5 And the number of homicide
victims in New York City had risen from 548 in 1963346 to nearly 2,000 in 1993,
the final year of Mayor David Dinkins' administration. 34 7 Although Giuliani is
often credited for the improved crime figures, it was Bratton and his Deputy
Commissioner, Jack Maple, who designed and implemented policing reforms.
As a federal prosecutor once said, "[t]he Mayor hired Bratton, and Bratton hired
Maple, and that created a paradigm shift in policing." 348
Crime declined beyond what anyone dreamed possible during the 28
months Bratton served as New York City Police Commissioner. 34 9 The murder
rate decreased by 20% his first year in office, and another 24% in 1995.350 The
number of murder victims dropped from 1,946 to 1,177, a 42% reduction. 3 5 1
Bratton's success is often incorrectly ascribed to the famous "Broken Windows"
strategy, which had been advanced by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson

342

See generally MAPLE, supra note 80, at 166.

343

See generally Bellin, supra note 95, at 1503-04.

34
See
New
York
City
Crime
Rates
1960-2015,
DISASTER
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/nycrime.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).

CTR.,

345
346

See Bellin, supra note 95, at 1498.
Thomas J. Lueck, Low Murder Rate Brings New York Back to '63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/nyregion/31murder.html.
347
348

New York City Crime Rates 1960-2015, supra note 344.
David
Remnick,
The
Crime Buster, NEW
YORKER
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1 997/02/24/the-crime-buster.
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(Feb.

24,

1997),

WILLIAM BRATFON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 294 (1998).

350

Uniform Crime Reporting, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). All the crime
statistics in these two paragraphs are compiled from this source.
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in their Atlantic Monthly article.35 2 Their "Quality of Life" theory claims that by
focusing on minor infractions, such as prostitution or graffiti, the police can have
a disproportionate effect in reducing the overall crime rate.
In his memoir, Turnaround, Bratton explained it would be too
"simplistic" to attribute the rapid decline in crime in New York City to the
quality-of-life enforcement efforts because it was just "one of a number of
strategies that were deployed." 3 5 3 Maple, who also wrote a memoir, The Crime
Fighter, was even more dismissive of the theory. 354
If a building has all its windows intact, the theory goes, it can sit
vacant and undisturbed for an indefinite period of time. But if
one window is broken and not quickly repaired, all hell breaks
loose. The implication is, if the police would take care of the
little things, the big things would take care of themselves ....
That's not how it works. Rapists and killers don't head for
another town when they see that graffiti is disappearing from the
subway. The average squeegee man doesn't start accepting
contract murders whenever he detects a growing tolerance for
squeegeeing.
Bratton's success as Police Commissioner can be attributed to six sometimes
overlapping strategies and policies: an increase in police manpower (which
largely resulted from an expansion initiated by Giuliani's predecessor, Mayor
David Dinkins);356 getting guns off the streets;357 anti-corruption campaigns;358

352
For examples of authors attributing Bratton's success to Broken Windows, see Richard
Bernstein, A Thinker Attuned to Thinking; James Q. Wilson Has Insights, Like Those on Cutting
Crime,
That
Tend
to
Prove
Out,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
22,
1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/22/arts/thinker-attuned-thinking-james-q-wilson-has-insightslike-those-cutting-crime.html?mcubz-3; George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows:
The
Police
and
Neighborhood
Safety,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
1982),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/;
Christina
Nifong, One Man's Theory is Cutting Crime in Urban Streets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 18,
1997), https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0218/021897.us.us.4.html.
3
BRATTON, supra note 349, at 229. Bratton's statements on Quality of Life policing have not
been entirely consistent. After returning to serve as Police Commissioner under Mayor Bill De
Blasio, Bratton wrote the following in a department report: "More than any other factor, what
caused this amazing change was Broken Windows, or quality-of-life policing." See Ken Auletta,
Fixing
Broken
Windows,
NEW
YORKER
(Sept.
7,
2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/09/07/fixing-broken-windows.
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MAPLE, supra note 80, at 154.
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See generally NYPD, POLICE STRATEGY No. 1: GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW

York (1994).
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improved management and information systems;3 59 shutting down public drug
markets; 3 60 and an emphasis on policing high crime locations (in which stop-andfrisk played a large role). 3 6 1
It is hardly surprising that the NYPD never publicly announced a plan to
randomly stop-and-frisk young black and Latino males on a massive scale.
However, there can be no doubt that this is eventually what occurred. The
aggregated data revealed the following: The NYPD made over 4.4 million
recorded stops from January, 2004, to June, 2012,362 and conducted 2.3 million
frisks for weapons (which were successful only 1.5% of the time);3 6 3 the NYPD
used force in 23% of the stops of blacks and 24% of Hispanics; 3 the NYPD
issued a summons or made an arrest in only 12% of the stops; 365 the most
common arrest was for marijuana. 3 66
2011 marked the apex of stop-and-frisk in New York City, and, that year,
the police recorded 686,000 stops of a population totaling less than nine
million.3 6 7 Although the stops were largely random, they were not randomly
distributed amongst the population. Approximately 87% of those stopped were
blacks or Hispanics, roughly 93% of those stopped were male, and about 51%
were under 25 years of age. 3 68
The number of recorded stops of young black men in 2011 was so
massive that it exceeded the total number of young black men living in New
York City. 3 69 If the police were stopping people on the basis of "reasonable
suspicion," one would presume that a reasonable number of those stopped would
be found to have engaged in unlawful behavior. Yet, in 2011, 88% of the people
stopped were neither arrested nor even issued a summons. 3 70 55.7% of persons
stopped were frisked.7 The police are supposed to have reasonable belief that a
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suspect is armed and dangerous before conducting a frisk, yet 98.5% of those
frisked had no weapons. 3 72
To understand why one of the most repressive police operations in the
nation's history was implemented in one of the country's most liberal cities, we
must turn to an important lesson Bratton learned while serving as the Chief of
the Transit Police in New York City (Bratton had started this position in April
1990, and he left in January 1992).373 At the time, fare evasion was rampant, and
the solution Bratton came up with was "the fare-evasion mini-sweep." 37 4 These
sweeps implemented Maple's theory that since it is very difficult to catch a crook
in the act of a crime, the police must try "to catch crooks when the crooks are
off-duty" 375 by "running warrant checks on every arrest or summons, including
those for minor quality-of-life violations." 37 6
The fare-evasion mini-sweep consisted of assigning numerous
undercover officers to the same station. 3 77 As Bratton explained, the officers
ended up arresting scores of people, but the "unanticipated by-product of the
sweeps came when we checked the identification and warrant status of
everybody we were arresting."3 78

During the early stages of the initiative, we found that one out
of every seven people arrested for fare evasion was wanted on
an outstanding warrant for a previous crime. One out of twentyone was carrying some type of weapon, whether a box cutter, a
knife, or a gun. As so often happens in policing, we had focused
on one problem to the exclusion of others. Now we were
beginning to understand the linkage between disorder and more
serious crimes. We hadn't thought of it, but it stands to reason
that someone coming into the system with the intention to
commit a crime is not likely to pay for the privilege. 37 9
The problem with using minor infractions to check for warrants and
conduct body searches is that people will take notice of what is happening and
modify their behavior. 380 Consider the first few words of Bratton's quote above,
"Duringthe early stages of the initiative, we found that ... .".381 The fare-evasion
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mini sweep was successful in part because of the abundance of low hanging
fruit.382 In time, however,
the bad guys wised up and began to leave their weapons home
and pay their fares. If the cops were going to be out in force, it
was better all around not to be armed on the subway. Fewer
weapons, fewer robberies and armed robberies, fewer murders,
fewer perpetrators, fewer victims.383
When Bratton became Police Commissioner, there were an ample
sufficiency of minor infractions to justify stops and possible misdemeanor
arrests. "Boom boxes, squeegee people, street prostitutes, public drunks,
panhandlers, reckless bicyclists, illegal after-hours joints, graffiti-New York
was overrun." 38 4 And aggressive enforcement against these minor infractions
helped prevent violent crime.
Time and time again, when cops interrupt someone drinking on
the street or a gang of kids drinking on the corner, pat them
down, and find a gun or a knife, they have prevented what would
have happened two or three hours later when that same person,
drunk, pulled out that gun or knife. We prevented the crime
before it happened. New York City police would be about
prevention, and we would do it lawfully. 385
Bratton was not applying Broken Windows by enforcing minor
infractions and hoping more serious crime would also abate. His officers used
minor infractions as the justification to stop people, demand identification, run
warrant checks, and possibly frisk them for illegal weapons. And, since the
NYPD was more interested in nabbing off-duty crooks than reducing minor
infractions, "Quality of Life" enforcement was concentrated in high crime
neighborhoods.386 Maple defended this approach by offering the following
rationale:
A bunch of young Wall Street analysts doing Jell-O shots during
a pub crawl along Madison Avenue may be just as likely to piss
in the street as a crew of robbers drinking malt liquor on a corner
in East New York.... But only one of those groups is likely to

382
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include somebody wanted on a warrant or somebody carrying a
nine in their waistband.387
Although Maple contended in his memoir that Wall Street analysts
"should have to clear the same hurdles before they're let off with just
summonses," just three paragraphs afterwards, he argued police need "to be more
selective about who we [are] arresting on quality-of-life infractions." 38 8
Essentially, certain infractions committed by certain types of people should be
ignored.3 8 9
When a team of cops fills up a van with arrestees, the booking
process can take those cops out of service for a whole day in
some cities. The public can't afford to lose that much police
protection for a bunch of first-time offenders, so the units
enforcing qualify-of-life laws must be sent where the maps show
concentrations of crime or criminals, and the rules governing the
stops have to be designed to catch the sharks, not the dolphins.
"Quality-of-Life Plus" is not "zero tolerance." 390
Maple may have advocated targeting "sharks," but what eventually
occurred was considerably different. By concentrating their efforts in high crime
neighborhoods, the NYPD increasingly fined and arrested the most economically
disadvantaged people for behavior which others engaged in with impunity. For
example, between 2008 and 2011, Brooklyn officers "issued an average of eight
bike-on-the-sidewalk summonses per year" in upscale Park Slope, but 2,050 in
Bedford-Stuyvesant.3 9 ' A second example occurred in 2003, when police
officers ticketed people drinking beer at a Fourth of July party on Rockaway
Beach in Queens. Later that weekend, countless people openly imbibed in
Central Park during a free New York Philharmonic concert. 3 92 Someone even
offered a cocktail to Mayor Bloomberg, who also was in attendance. 3 9 3 To this

388
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day, the official Central Park website advises Philharmonic fans that "alcohol is
generally tolerated, but there are police around, so keep it low-key." 394
Arresting subway turnstile jumpers and frisking them for weapons is like
sending Al Capone to prison on tax evasion charges. Neither event raises a public
outcry. Targeting young black males for drinking on street corners, while
ignoring the same infraction when committed by classical music aficionados in
Central Park is more problematic. Arguably, classical music lovers should be
allowed to sip their chardonnay because there have never been problems related
to public inebriation at these performances. But how does one justify the moral
incongruity of issuing thousands of bike-on-sidewalk summonses in one of the
city's poorest neighborhoods, while ignoring the same infraction in one of the
richest? Or, how does one defend the hypocrisy of arresting thousands for putting
their feet up on the subway, at a time when Mayor Bloomberg, much to the
annoyance of nearby residents, was repeatedly landing and taking off on his
private helicopter from a helipad during restricted hours? 395
B.

The Toll Exacted by Stop-and-Frisk

Since stop-and-frisk was conducted on such a massive scale, involving
literally millions of people, the only way the human mind can comprehend the
toll it exacted is to examine it at the community and individual level. Brownsville
is a small predominantly black neighborhood in Brooklyn, with a population of
14,000.396 Between January 2006 and March 2010, the police made 52,000 stops
in Brownsville.397
Young black males between 15 to 34 years of age comprised 11% of the
total population, but they accounted for 68% of the stops. 398 That would mean
1,550 young black men had been stopped more than 35,000 times or about 8
times a year during this period.399 It is certainly possible that a number of these
stops consisted of non-Brownsville residents who were passing through the
neighborhood, but the young men who lived in Brownsville were also

394
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presumably stopped additional times outside their neighborhood. The stops were
either being made randomly, or the police were exceedingly poor evaluators of
suspicious behavior. In 2009, the police made 13,200 stops in Brownsville,
which resulted in the arrests of only 109 people.400
The high percentage of arrest-less stops is easily explained. Supervisors
were essentially imposing quotas. 4 01 A number of police officers interviewed by
the New York Times said that "certain performance measures were implicitly
expected in their monthly activity reports." 4 02 "[T]he floor number was 10 a
month" in New York, according to one officer.403 Another officer said that the
"pressure was felt more overtly to get an arrest or a criminal summons, but in
lieu of those, extra [stops] would compensate."4 04 Officers reported that fulfilling
their quotas was easy: "Just go to the well." 4 0 5
The "well" was the lobby of one of the many public housing buildings.406
A retired officer reported said that his supervisors considered the lobby to be a
"legitimate" source for a stop. 40 7 In at least three of the buildings "the [front]
door locks ha[d] been broken for weeks." 4 0 8 Not surprisingly, residents were not
in the habit of using a key to open an unlocked door. 40 9 However, failing to use
a key gave the police a pretext for making suspected trespassing stops. It was
reported that 90% of the stops were of residents who lived in the building and
resulted in neither a summons nor an arrest. 4 10 However, the stop would be duly
recorded and the officer could fulfill her monthly quota.4 1 1
These numbers may initially sound reassuring, but it also means that
10% of the people stopped were either given a summons for trespassing or even
arrested. It is impossible to know how many of these people simply lacked
identification to prove their residency or were visitmig a friend or family member.
However, patrol officers did complain that they were being pressured to make
arrests and issue criminal citations.4 12 Other news organizations, in addition to
the New York Times, also received complaints alleging commanding officers
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"constantly want you to violate people's rights and make false statements in
order to get the arrest." 4 13
Some patrolmen were so opposed to these practices that they began
secretly recording their commanding officers.4 1 4 In one example, a sergeant said,
"you can always articulate later," meaning legal justification could be created
after a stop had been made.415 On another occasion, the commander wanted
everyone exiting a particular building to be stopped regardless of individualized
suspicion: "Anybody moving, anybody coming out that building, 250.",416
(Police officers in New York City are required to fill out a UF-250, or the "StopQuestion-Frisk" form, every time they make a stop.). 4 17 Another commander, a
keen observer of sartorial styles, was recorded saying following:
I'm tired of bandanas on their waist and I'm tired of these beads.
Red and black beads mean Bloods. Their bandanas-if they're
walking down the street and they've got a bandana sticking out
their ass, coming out there-they've got to be stopped. A 250 at
least. At least.418

Officer Pedro Serrano was told that he had to stop "the right people, the
right place, the right location." 4 19 In case Serrano failed to understand, the
Deputy Inspector explained exactly who the "right people" are-male blacks.
"And I told you at roll call, and I have no problem telling you this, male blacks
14 to 20, 21."420
Commanding officers in these recordings often referred to numbers
which correlated to the number of arrests and summonses patrol officers were
expected to issue every month. "If you think one and 20 is breaking your balls,
guess what you'll be doing. You'll be doing a lot more," said one supervisor.42 1
Yet another supervising officer reinforced this message while injecting a bit of

413
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career counseling advice into his diatribe: "Next week, [it'll be] 25 and one, 35
and one, and until you decide to quit this job and go to work at Pizza Hut, this is
what you are going to do until then." 42 2
These commanding officers did not constitute just "a few bad apples."423
They were implementing policies enacted at the highest levels of city
government.42 4 For example, according to the sworn testimony of a New York
State Senator, Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told him that he had his officers
focus on young blacks and Hispanics "because he wanted to instill fear in them,
every time they leave their home, they could be stopped by the police."4 25 Mayor
Bloomberg even publicly pronounced that not enough black people were being
stopped. "I think we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too
little. It's exactly the reverse of what they say." 4 26
The most surprising aspect of these policies and statements is that they
were made after New York City had already experienced "the largest crime drop
ever documented during periods of social and governmental continuity." 4 27 The
pressure of electoral politics explains this strange phenomenon. It is impossible
to reduce crime, year after year, decade after decade, but try explaining this fact
to mayors whose electoral fate is often determined by their ability to improve
upon the prior year's crime figures. This dynamic even occurred during Bratton's
short tenure as Police Commissioner, as revealed by a conversation Maple had
with Giuliani:
Maple tried to explain to the mayor that because of the success
of our Gun Strategy, fewer people were carrying guns, and that
the more we continued to pursue this strategy, the fewer gun
arrests we could expect. "No!" he said, gritting his teeth. "This
number goes down and this number goes up!" Meaning, the
higher the number of arrests, the lower the amount of crime.42 8
In our federal system of government, mayors are primarily responsible
for crime and education.4 29 Maple's theory that the police must strive to "catch
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crooks when the crooks are off-duty"4 30 by "running warrant checks on every
arrest or summons, including those for minor quality-of-life violations" enjoyed
great success initially, but the tactic was eventually plagued by the law of
diminishing returns.4 3 1 Petty criminals modified their behavior, guns were taken
off the streets, and crime was reduced dramatically. But unrelenting pressure to
reduce crime explains why commanders began demanding patrol officers make
suspicionless stops and why quotas were increased from "one and twenty," to
"twenty-five and one," to "thirty-five and one."4 32
Patrol officers began stopping people for the most innocent of activities
not because of racial animus, but because they were being ordered to do so. For
example, one resident who lived in public housing was quoted as saying that the
police will "give you a ticket for trespassing 'cause you're sitting on the bench
that's in front of your building. I can't sit on the bench in front of my building?
Why's the bench there?" 433 Another equated it to living "in an 'outside
-434

prison.
These allegations sound outlandish, but they were confirmed by patrol
officers who were asked in court to define the term "furtive movements." 4 35 One
officer explained that "usually" a furtive movement is someone "hanging out in
front of [a] building, sitting on the benches or something like that." 4 36 Another
explained that the term "is a very broad concept" that could include a person
"changing direction," "walking in a certain way," or "[a]cting a little
suspicious." 437
When millions of people are stopped under these circumstances, false
arrests will inevitably occur. Consider just one such example. In May 2011,
Charles Bradley, a black 51-year-old man, went to visit his fianc6e in the
Bronx. 4 38 A resident recognized him and let him into the building. 439 Bradley
knocked on his fianc6e's door, but she is partly deaf and did not hear him.440
Since he did not have a key, he went downstairs and exited the building.441
Officer Miguel Santiago saw him leaving, questioned him, and then arrested him
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for trespass.442 The officer's version of the arrest would later be discredited
because the paperwork he filled out contradicted his trial testimony on four key
points." 3 Moreover, he also admitted to having lied on two previous UF-250s to
get revenge against an individual with whom his friend was having a dispute.44 4
Bradley would spend several hours in police custody; he was stripped,
searched, fingerprinted, and held in a cell." 5 He was eventually given a Desk
Appearance Ticket with a court date and released.4 46 As a security guard,
Bradley's arrest was automatically shared with his licensing authority.44 7 In order
to keep his license and his job, Bradley was required to provide documentation
of the status of his case within one month of his arrest.448 However, after being
issued a Desk Appearance Ticket, as had happened to Bradley, the average
person has to wait four months before the initial court date.449
Bradley was exceptionally fortunate because a non-profit legal
organization, the Bronx Defenders, took his case and assigned two lawyers to
assist him. 45 0 They advised him to get his fiancee to write a notarized letter
explaining he had been her invited guest, and they advocated on his behalf with
his employer, his licensing agency in Albany, and the District Attorney's
Office.451 His attorneys eventually persuaded the prosecutor to drop the charges,
and Bradley kept his license and his job.452 However, as Bradley later related
with a "quavering" voice and eyes full of tears, "I could have lost everything in
my life because of this arrest." 453
One would hope that Bradley's situation was unusual and that the vast
majority of the people arrested under the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program were
guilty. However, the penalties imposed for those guilty of minor infractions are
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truly draconian, especially for those who are unable to make bail.454 According
to a report which analyzed arrest data from 2008, roughly 75% of non-felony
defendants were released on their own recognizance.4 55 However, of the 19,137
defendants who were required to post bail, which was typically set at $1,000 or
less, 87% could not do so and were sent to jail.456 There were over 16,000 such
defendants in 2008, and they spent on average over two weeks in the notoriously
dangerous Rikers Island awaiting trial.457
As punitive as misdemeanor criminal penalties sometimes are, the civil
penalties, for many, are even worse. Criminal records are available in every
state. 4 58 They can be accessed on commercial databases, and most employers run
background checks. 4 59 Landlords, educational institutions, loan officers, and
many others routinely check an applicant's criminal record. 4 60 A poor person of
color is born with two strikes against her. Add a criminal conviction, and she is
quite possibly out: out of a job, out of her apartment, or, for immigrants, possibly
kicked out of the country.
The American criminal justice system is incredibly decentralized. There
are over 12,000 independently operating police departments employing almost a
half million full-time sworn personnel. 46 1 Therefore, it is well beyond the scope
of this article to document the number of agencies which have instituted a stopand-frisk approach to policing. However, scholars agree the NYPD "mass

454
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note 449; James Forman, Jr., Racial CritiquesofMass Incarceration:Beyond the New Jim Crow,
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misdemeanor" tactics are now used nationwide and statistics prove the point 4 62 :
49% of black men and 44% of Latino men will be arrested by the age of 23.463
In an age when a well-paying job has become perhaps the most sought-after goal
in society, a system has arisen in which an increasing percentage of already
disadvantaged citizens are eliminated from the competition.464 Justice
Sotomayor wrote such an emotional dissent in Strieff because she understood
that the majority was sanctioning the NYPD's stop-and-frisk approach to
policing, and she feared the toll such measures would take on the targeted
population.4 65
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the Strieffdecision was how unaware
the Justices are of the basic operation of the American criminal justice system.
During the oral argument in Strieff, for example, Justice Elena Kagan admitted
she was "surprised beyond measure" by the number of outstanding warrants in
America.46 6 Justice Samuel Alito also appeared to have no conception of the
central role warrant checks play in today's mass misdemeanor justice system. As
the reader will recall, there was an arrest warrant for Strieff because he had failed
to pay a "minor traffic violation." 467 During oral argument, counsel for the
defendant warned that failure to invoke the exclusionary rule would "create an
incentive to have even more warrants for even more infractions." 468 Justice Alito
scoffed at this idea and rhetorically asked, "Do you think the judges in the
traffic - in the traffic courts are going to start issuing a lot of warrants because
they want to provide the basis for - for randomly stopping people?" 469 But, as
Justice Sotomayor pointed out, Alito had a shockingly antiquated conception of
this process; the issuance of these warrants is now largely automatic and
computerized. 4 70 This was another of Bratton's innovations, he ordered that all
criminal summonses be backed by a warrant.47
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463
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C. Did Stop-and-FriskReduce Crime?
In 2013, stop-and-frisk came to a halt.4 72 It had already become a central
issue in the mayoral campaign when Judge Shira Scheindlin declared the
program unconstitutional in Floyd v. City of New York.4 7 3 Three months later,
Bill DeBlasio, who had promised to curb the practice, was elected Mayor.4 74
Although the program has been halted in New York City, the same approach in
various manifestations has already spread to countless other jurisdictions.47 5
Therefore, rather than analyzing the Floyd decision, we will ask a question which
Judge Shira Scheindlin refused to consider in Floyd.4 7 6 Did stop-and-frisk help
reduce crime in New York City?
It must be acknowledged that the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program,
unlike the first three stages of racially targeted dragnet policing, was based on
reliable statistics. Young men of color were targeted because over 90% of the
suspects in shootings in New York City involve young black and Latino men, as
do over 90% of the victims.4 77 It was these statistics that led Mayor Bloomberg
to claim the police were stopping "whites too much and minorities too little." 478
Moreover, Maple was entirely correct when he argued that it is very
difficult to catch a criminal in the act of committing a crime. 4 79 This is
particularly true with shootings. Murder and violent crime usually result from
impulsive and "emotionally charged and spontaneous events" as opposed to
premeditation and deliberate planning. 480 Therefore, the police chose pretext

472
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known shooting suspects were described as black or Hispanic. Bratton has also noted how "[o]ur
statistics told us clearly that a large percentage of crime in New York was being perpetrated by
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infractions to justify stopping young men of color and searching them for
weapons. This explains why marijuana arrests increased by 6,500% from 1991
to 2001 while prostitution arrests declined by 15%.481 The NYPD was not
enforcing all Quality of Life violations; they were concentrating on infractions
which provided a legal justification for them to target their preferred cohort.4 82
However, as minor infractions decreased, the police were eventually reduced to
stopping people for making "furtive movements" while sitting on benches
outside their apartment buildings.
If we look at stop-and-frisk from a moral and not a legal perspective, it
is certainly possible to argue that the imposition of random stops is a small price
to pay for fewer murders and an overall reduction in crime. And, it is
theoretically possible to reform the severe criminal and civil penalties imposed
upon those who have committed misdemeanor infractions. Criminal records can
be sealed, and cash bail can be eliminated. Therefore, the question of whether
stop-and-frisk reduced crime in New York City remains a vital question.
To answer this question, we must first ask whether the NYPD was
responsible for reducing crime in New York City, or if some other factor was the
cause. It is hardly surprising that an unprecedented crime decline occurring in
the media capital of the world has led to competing theories explaining the
phenomenon. Our review of the vast literature is necessarily brief.
The most sophisticated analysis of whether socio-economic factors were
responsible for the decline has been offered by Professor Franklin Zimring. 484
Zimring analyzed socio-economic data in New York City on a borough to
borough basis, and he has shown how conditions in the "outer boroughs"Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx-remained relatively stable during the city's
near 20 year crime decline.4 85 He concluded the evidence that "some
combination of policing variables account[ed] for much of the New York
difference is overwhelming." 4 8 6
A second alternative explanation to police reforms can also be
eliminated. Reduced drug consumption patterns were not responsible because
cocaine and heroin abuse also remained remarkably constant over time. 4 8 7 Since
precise data on narcotics consumption are not available, criminologists often use
overdose deaths to estimate the level of drug abuse. The number of cocaine and
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heroin overdose deaths in the mid-2000s had decreased by only 10% since 1990,
and Zinring therefore concludes only a marginal decrease in consumption took
place.4 88
If socio-economic factors and drug consumption cannot account for the
reduction in crime, law enforcement measures presumably provide the
explanation. The incarceration rate is usually the starting point of discussion
when considering whether law enforcement measures are effectively
discouraging crime.489 In fact, for a long time, "incapacitation was not merely
the dominant mode of crime control endorsed by a broad segment of the policy
community but the only mechanism. . . ."490 However, the rates of crime and
incarceration in New York City decreased simultaneously. 49' Beginning in 1997,
the total prison and jail population of New Yorkers began a long decline. 4 92 "By
2002, a smaller number of persons were confined than in the 1990 base year, and
by 2008, there were 10,000 fewer criminals being incapacitated from New York
City than in 1990."493 Thus, while an increased incarceration rate may or may
not have contributed to improvements in the national crime rate, such an
explanation is inapplicable in New York City.
It is apparent that policing strategies, possibly including stop-and-frisk,
accounted for a large percentage of the New York City crime decline. Zimring
has concluded that since these reforms were instituted simultaneously, it is
impossible to "apportion crime control credit" amongst them. 4 94 However, not
all reforms were in fact instituted concurrently.49 5
As noted, NYPD officers have long been required to fill out a form, a
UF-250, when they make a stop. 4 9 6 Officers record the time and the location
where the incident occurred, as well as the names and physical descriptions of
the persons stopped.49 7 The form lists potential legal justifications, including
"Fits Description," ["Actions Indicative of 'Casing' Victim or Location,"] and

488
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"Furtive Movements." 498 Compliance remained uneven until 2003, when Judge
Scheindlin ordered the NYPD to comply with its internal regulations by
completing the forms. 4 9 9 Nonetheless, pre-2003 UF-250 data still offers a rough
indication of when the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk as a proactive policy
began.oo
The data reveals that the number of completed UF-250s averaged 43,758
during the years from 1990 to 1993.501 There was a slight uptick to 47,665 in
Bratton's first year, 1994,502 but the number fell the following year to 44,654.503
It was not until after Bratton left office that stop-and-frisk began its exponential
rise. The number of completed UF-250s increased to 114,825 in 1998,50 by 2003
it had risen to 160,851,505 and then peaked at 680,000 in 2011.506 Even if the
figures prior to 2003 are somewhat unreliable, they are still indicative of how
little emphasis Bratton placed on the policy. The figures are miniscule compared
with what followed, and, since Bratton's overarching approach to law
enforcement is based on the accumulation of accurate crime data, the fact that
UF-250s were not always completed during his tenure supports the idea that he
did not view stop-and-frisk as an essential strategy. Moreover, murder was
reduced by almost 40% during his two years in office. 07 Thus, it appears that the

498
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aforementioned policing strategies were quite effective without the pervasive use
of stop-and-frisk.
Not only was the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk instituted after the
murder rate had dramatically declined, the program was curtailed after Mayor
DeBlasio was elected and he asked Bill Bratton to return to his old job.os
Contrary to the repeated warnings that had been issued by Mayor Bloomberg and
Commissioner Kelly, the murder rate continued declining after stop-and-frisk
was largely eliminated. 50 9 There were 515 murders in New York City in 201151o
and over 686,000 recorded stops.51 By 2015, there were only 22,563 recorded
stops, 5 12 but only 333 murders occurred in the previous year, 5 13 a 35% decline.
Thus, based on the available evidence, it appears that the aggressive use of stopand-frisk was an ineffective crime fighting tool. Of course, one might ask, why
would anyone think that stopping people while they are sitting on benches or
walking through unlocked doors was a good way to fight crime?
V.

CONCLUSION

A reader unfamiliar with America's long history of racially targeted
dragnet policing might casually dismiss Justice Sotomayor's warning that, if the
Court sanctioned the kind of stop which had occurred in Strieff police officers
across America might soon start making suspicionless stops of "joggers, dog
walkers, and lemonade vendors." 5 14 However, this was no hyperbolic claim, such
stops had already been occurring in New York City for years.5 15 Issuing a
summons to unlicensed vendors was one of the types of violations that the police
began specifically targeting in New York City. 5 16 Not only were the police
targeting unlicensed vendors and bicyclists who rode on the sidewalk (in
Bedford-Stuyvesant at least), they were also targeting joggers. In 2014, Reuters
randomly sampled 25 black New York City police officers.517 "All but one said
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that, when off duty and out of uniform, they had been victims of racial
profiling."5 18 One particular incident experienced by an off-duty officer further
illustrates how Justice Sotomayor's worst fears have already been confirmed. A
retired sergeant said he had been taking a jog through Prospect Park and had been
stopped. "I had my ID on me so it didn't escalate.... [b]ut what's suspicious
about a jogger? In jogging clothes?" 519
Strieff can be seen as representing the final nail in the coffin. Racially
targeted dragnet policing has been extended to the fourth and final mode of
transportation, simply walking down the street, and the Court has once again
declared such measures to be constitutional. However, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have already been so eviscerated that we should not pretend
that a different ruling would have turned the tide. If an officer "requests" a
pedestrian to stop and produce their identification, most people will "agree."
Justice Thomas even reminded the police of this fact in Strieff "Officer Fackrell
should have asked Strieff whether he would speak with him, instead of
demanding that Strieff do so." 52 0
Secondly, when an officer says the suspect has made "furtive
movements," one of the most common explanations given for the stops in New
York City, the stop may be justifiable under Terry.5 2 1 Strieffwas unusual because
the officer failed to invoke one of these two justifications. 52 2 Perhaps the
importance of Strieff was largely symbolic, but the symbolism of the decision is
most disheartening. For the fourth time since 1980, the Court has condoned a
racially targeted dragnet policing program.

idUSKBNOK1 1EV20141223 (The reporter confirmed in an email correspondence with the author
that the police officers chosen for the study had been randomly sampled.).
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